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The natural mechanics of underground reservoirs, in
which oil and gas are trapped, operate without regard to
the man-made ownership boundaries above. Oil and gas
"migrate" to the lower pressure area when the seal of the
reservoir is broken. Thus, the natural forces at work do
not guarantee an overlying owner that the oil and gas
will remain in place to await his pleasure of taking un-
less, of course, the entire reservoir lies below the own-
er's tract. A landowner is seldom so fortunate. If, as
is usual, this common source of supply is overlain by
many owners, certain jural relationships are thrust up-
on them all, each to the other, relative to the exploita-
tion of the reservoir.
This article is concerned with the nature and back-
ground of the legal relationships involved, their evolu-
tion from the rule of capture, and their manifestations
before and after the key case of Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana
.
177 U.S. 190 C1900).
1.

Nature of the Rights Involved
Since this entire discourse is directed toward the explor-
ation of the place of correlative rights in oil and gas law,
every portion hereof is intended to foster that purpose. Some
precision of definition may, however, serve to establish some
recognizable frames of reference within which analysis may be
contained.
Lawyers and laymen alike bandy the term "right" or
"rights" around with assurance and proprietorship. We are
said to have "civil rights", "property rights", "constitutional
rights", etc. Rights are variously described as "inalienable",
"natural", "fundamental", "conditional", "Godgiven", etc.
With respect to possessions or a place in line at the play-
ground, children quarrel and cry over them. With more compli-
cated motives, adults fight and commit crimes over them.
They are promised and praised by politicians—lauded and
litigated by lawyers.
Such an exercise in semantics is, I trust, sufficient to
demonstrate that the varied meanings and modifications
of words muddies the waters of perception and analysis.
If one has a "right" he is likely to think of it as a
prevailing and boundless thing which cannot be properly over-
turned. If it is violated, some positive action of restitu-
tion is in order. It is antonymous with "unjust", "wrongful",
and "incorrect". It seems to be human nature that the "right"
attains vigor in direct proportion to the greed, selfishness,




For examples A, a newspaperman, publishes a story deprecating
B. A is concerned about his "right" of freedom of the press.
B counters with his "right" to enjoy his good name. For ano-
ther example: C, a landowner, drills an oil well on his prop-
erty. He has no attractive market for the gas and finds it to
his immediate economic benefit to allow the gas to escape.
This injures the gas field of D, an adjoining landowner. C
is content with his "right" to capture and reduce the oil and
gas to his possession and to dispose of it as he pleases. D
is impressed with his "right" to the continued and full enjoy-
ment of the items of value underlying the surface of his
property.
It is obvious that all the claimed "rights" in the fore-
going examples cannot prevail. So, by legislative fiat or
judicial interpretation, the cases of A v. B and C v. D have
to eventually be resolved. Some are going to learn that
their "rights"5 aren't rights after all, or that they arent't
as potent as they believed. All will perhaps discover that
their '"rights ' are not bound by the same peripheral lines as
they anticipated.
Writers in jurisprudence have long recognized the value
of classification of jural relationships in order to assist in
their clarification. Hohfeld sought to do this in his classi-
1.
fication of jural correlatives and jural opposites.
1. Hohfeld, Fundamental legal Conceptions as applied in Judi-
cial Reasoning, 63-64 (1923), " these eight conceptions,
rights and duties, privileges and no-rights, powers and lia<=
bilities, immunities and disabilities, seem to be what may
be called 'the lowest common denominators of the law'". For
an explanatory and generally non-critical treatment of Hoh-
feld's analysis, see Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology.
29 Yale L.J. 163 (1919).
3.

He was preceded by Austin who offered an analytical discussion
of rights. Although Austin's analysis was fairly scientific,
he concluded with a brief definition of a right. It has value
2.
for its simplicity:
"A party has a right, when another or others are
bound or obligated by the law, to do or to for-
bear, towards or in regard of him. M
3
M. Radin in his "A Restatement of Hohfeld" perhaps best
4
summarizes the value of analysis of legal transactions:
"It /Hohfeldian system/ professes, however, —-and I think
successfully—to be able to reduce any legal transaction,
however complicated, to its actual constituent elements
or atoms, and its use may save lawyers from the fallacy
of accident, the subtlest and most insidious of the pit-
falls of the law."
Hohfeld's or any other "analysis" attempts to algebraically
describe repeated situations, such as judgments of courts,
in such a way that they fall in a pattern. Radin declares
that while this may be of some service in the large task of
collecting, memorizing or teaching these judgments, it is not
5
in the "much more vitally important task of forecasting them"
Be that as it may, the probabilities of forecasting judgments,
have long been enhanced by an examination and categorization
of precedent,
2. 1 Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence 366-367 (1875).
3. 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1141 (1938)
4. Id. at 1164.
4 » Op. cit. supra note 3, at 1147.
4.

Case law on the definition of correlative rights is not
abundant for the reason that judicial declarations relative
to them, without benefit of statutes, is scarce. The Alphon-
6
zo E. Be ll Corpor ation v. Bell View Oil Syndicate case indi-
cates the reciprocal relation involved in the term "correla-
tive". «Jt was held that the "common and correlative" right
to take oil and gas passing through the surface location was
common to the extent that every surface owner had a right to
reduce the oil and gas to his possession by a well drilled
on his own property. Common ownership of the oil and gas
was a rejected concept.
7
Bristor v P Cheatham is of some help in that it distin-
guished between "reasonable user" and "correlative rights."
The former is a term applicable to water law and is sometimes
referred to as "correlative rights". However, reasonable
user is usually intended to mean the limited taking of water
for purposes incident to beneficial enjoyment while under the
meaning of correlative rights, the landowner may take only
his proportionate share.
The Texas court has set forth a good conservative defi-
nition of correlative rights. This definition was adopted
from Summers', which is quoted later in this paper. The
8
definition of the Texas court is;
6. 24 Cal. App. 2d 587, 76 P. 2d 167 (1938).
7. 75 Ariz. 227, 255P. 2d 173, (1953).




1. Each owner of land in a common source of supply
of oil and gas has legal privileges as against
other owners of land therein to take oil or gas
therefrom by lawful operations conducted on his
own land.
2 Each such owner has duties to other owners not
to* exercise his privileged operations so as to
injure the common source of supply.
3. Each such owner has rights that others not exer-
cise their privileges of taking so as to injure the
common source of supply.
Summers' definition, from which the above purportedly came
9
as a quotation, goes a little further:
"The term 'correlative rights' is merely a conven-
ient method of indicating that each owner of land
in a common source of supply of oil and gas has
legal privileges as against other owners of land
therein to take oil and gas therefrom by lawful
operations conducted on his own land limited, how-
ever, by duties to others not to injure the source
of supply and by duties not to take an undue pro-
portion of the oil and gas. In addition, of course
to this aggregate of legal relations, each landowner
has duties to the public not to waste oil and gas."
(Emphasis supplied)
9. 1 Summers Oil and Gas. 180 (perm. ed. 1954). Summers
was careful to describe relationships involved in the terms
of Hohfeldian analysis. See the use of "no-right" at page
146: "—discussion will be concerned with the privilege of
A, as the owner of Blackacre—— to take oil or gas therefrom
by operations lawfully conducted-— and the correlative no-
rights of all other persons, B.C., etc.—that he so take
the oil and gas."
6.

It will be noted that the Texas court omitted those por-
tions of Summers' definition relating to (1) the taking of an
undue proportion and (2) the landowner's duties to the public
not to waste oil and gas. These portions of the Summers de-
finition are not universally accepted. Courts have, in the
main, been willing to leave the setting of standards for tak-
ing an equitable share and for waste up to the legislatures.
Accepted or not, the "undue proportion" and "waste" part
of Summers' definition are firmly established in the milieu
10
of correlative rights. Correlative rights are probably most
easily defined and identified by a description of the for-
bidden conduct (no rights) which invades the interests involv-
ed, rather than the rights which are protected. So, correla-
tive rights are often described in terms of "waste", "undue
proportion 90 and the various tortious invasions of properties
11
which are capable of exploiting the common source of supply.
10. Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 210 (1900): "It
follows.... that the use by one of his power to seek to con-
vert a part of the common fund to actual possession may re-
sult in an undue proportion being attributed to one of the
possessors of the rights, to the detriment of others, or by
waste by one or more, to the annihilation of the rights of
the remainder," Cf. Williams & Meyers, Manual of Oil and
Gas Terms, p. 50 (1957): "There appear to be two aspects
of the doctrine of correlative rights: (1) as a corollary
of the rule of capture, each person has a right to produce
oil from his well, and (2) a right of the landowner to be
protected against damage to a common source of supply and
a right to a fair and equitable share of the source of sup=
ply." Note further how Summers states, in effect, that A
has a duty not to take an undue proportion of the oil and
gas, whereas Williams & Meyers state the correlative of this
relationship, e.g., that B has a xight to a fair and equit-
able share,
11, For an interesting classification of correlative rights in
terms of the forbidden conduct see Kuntz, Correlative
Rights in Oil and Gas. 30 Miss. L.J. 1, (1958).
7.

It is probably better to define them in positive terms as recipro-
cal legal relationships pertaining to the privilege to acquire
and the ownership of property. Thus, when values and concepts
change, as they do, it is not necessary to resurvey and re-
align all of the invasions of the rights, but it is only
necessary to augment or deplete the scope of the right within
the bounds of the new definition. For instance, conservation
is the antithesis of waste. If, then, conservation is thought
of as anti=waste, and correlative rights are thought of as
anti-waste, it is easy to become trapped in the syllogism
that conservation and correlative rights are equated. However,
there are instances, as will be seen, where conservation and
correlative rights clash.
"Natural rights", as "correlative". As final flavor to
the definition of correlative rights as a reciprocal relation-
ship wherein each landowner has a privilege to take, coupled
with a duty not to take an undue proportion from the common
source of supply, it should be recalled that this genus of
reciprocity is not otherwise unknown in property law.
For example, the right of lateral support from adjoining
landowners is a reciprocal relationship where each adjoining
landowner must depend upon the other. It is described by the
12
Minnesota court as a "natural right"".
"The right of lateral support is said to be one of
12. Sime v. Jensen, 213 Minn 476, 7 N.W. 2d 325,327 (1942).
8.

property, arising from the fact that in a state of
nature all land is held together and supported by
adjacent lands by operation of the forces of nature.
Ownership of land is acqui red and held subject to the
rights and burdens arising from that situation.
Supported land has a right of lateral support from
that which naturally affords it support. Supporting
land is burdened with affording such support which
it naturally supports,, 9 '' (Emphasis supplied)
Tiffany describes the reciprocal rights of owners and
occupants of land as "natural rights" to enjoy the use of
the land in its natural condition without interference
13
from others. With respect to the interference with
underground water, the old "natural right" to absolutely
control perculating waters going through ones land is now
14
appearing as a "correlative right". What was once a
natural right on behalf of every landowner to do as he
pleased with waters is now a correlative right in all par-
15
ties that reasonable user be the standard. This not only
goes to show the dynamics of our law as guided by the atti-
tudes and conceptions of people, but as well, that a dated
definition is a static thing, subject to becoming over-
16
aged and recast in the light of tomorrow. Thus, on the
13. 3 Tiffany, Real Property. §714, (3d ed. 1939).
14. Id. at § 746.
15. City of Pasedena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 207
P. 2d 17 (1949) and Jones v. Oz~Ark-Val Poultry Co., 306 S.W.
2d 111 (Ark. 1957).
16. Tiedeman, The Unwritten Constitut ion of the United States
76, (1890)s "The so-called natural rights depend upon, and
vary with, the legal and ethical conceptions of the people.
As presently developed, the doctrine of natural rights may
be tersely stated as a freedom from all legal restraint that
is not needed to prevent injury to others...."
9.

modern side of "natural—correlative rights" the Oklahoma court
17
said:
".o. Nature does not provide proper underground restrain-
ing barriers which will prevent one man's wrongful produc-
tion practices from affecting the whole reservoir...."
In a day that has passed for some courts, and by some courts
even today, this philosophy would have been and is: Since na-
ture provided no barrier, there is no barrier (or there is no
barrier unless the legislature erects one.)
Backqround_of_jthe rights involved
In 1859, the same year that Col. Drake was struggling to
bring in his oil well in Titusville, Pennsylvania, the House
of Lords was struggling with problems concerning water rights,
that were soon to be reconsidered in the law of oil and gas
18
in America. Lord Kingsdown declared that the decision was
one of the most important ones "that ever came under the con-
19
sideration of a court of justice". It is most certain that
none of the Lords knew that they were dealing with such matters
later to become known as "The Rule of Capture", and "Correla-
tive Rights", as they are referred to in oil and gas law.
Still, their observations during the lengthy perscrutation of
the rights involved were much the same as those later used by
American judges when they were required to adjudicate rights
concerning the exploitation of oil sands.
,
In the English case, the plaintiff Chasemore owned and
17. Spiers v. Magnolia Petroleum Co. 206 Okla 503, 244 P. 2d
852, 855 (1952). (Quotation from brief, adopted by court.)
18. Chasemore v. Richards, 1 Eng. Rul. Cas. 729 (Ex. 1859).
19. Id. at 758.
10.

operated an ancient mill on the River Wandle, about one mile
away from the town of Croydon. The milistream was fed by
waters "....some flowing as little surface streams into
the river; /and/ in other instances finding their whole
20
way underground into the river." The defendant, representing
the town, dug a 74 foot well and proceeded to pump large
quantities* of water, in a reservoir, for use of the towns-
people. The taking of the underground waters through the
well dried up the river sufficiently to cause loss to the
plaintiff in the operation of his mill.
The House of Lords held that this was a case of
damnum absque injuria, relying heavily upon the earlier case
21
of Acton v p Blundell.
Ghasemore's barrister urged that there was a "natural
right" that owners overlying subterranean waters only use
a reasonable amount<=°and that this reasonable amount was
exceeded in the case at bar. He referred to a criticism of
Acton v f Blundell case by Baron Parke in the "Law Journal"
which went, "This Court and, I believe, all other Courts
disapprove of that part of the judgment which denies the
22
natural right to the water." This natural right of which
he was speaking was what the plaintiff argued in the Acton
20. Op. Cit„ supra note 18, at 730.
21. 12 Mee. & Wels. 324, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex. 1843).
Here the mining operations of the defendant drained the
plaintiff's (also a mill owner) wells dry.
22. 0p P Cit. supra note 18, at 737.
11.

V? JUiiBiifill case, i.e., the right to share in the common
23
source of supply by ordinary use.
The Lords were impressed, however, with the practical
uncertainties of underground waters in their search for an
answer to the adjudication of the parties' rights. These
practical uncertainties—not knowing where the water came
from, how £ ar it travelled, or how much there was—and thus
not knowing how to make a fair apportionment, were the same
uncertainties that were later to bedevil judges in oil jmd
gas cases and to furnish suasion for the rule of capture.
Without knowledge of these facts pertaining to underground
waters, their Lordships felt that the plaintiff's claimed
rights were too indefinite and unlimited to deserve judicial
protection. Further, as one of his Lordships observed, the
well under consideration was sunk to supply the entire town
of Croydon, He reckoned that if every family had sunk a
well in Croydon, a greater total drain of the water supply
would probably result, and the plaintiff would have to concede
that there would be no injuria, even if he were damaged.
American courts during the same period were equally at
a loss in arriving at a rule of apportionment of underground
waters without facts of their nature:
"The secret, changeable, and uncontrollable character
of underground water in its operation is so diverse
23, He urged that it would be proper for neighbors to dig
wells for their "occupational purposes" although it might
work an injury on one, or some, of the neighbors. He urged
further that the use by the defendant of steam engines, etc.,
was unreasonable curtailing his enjoyment of the water.
12.

and uncertain that we cannot well subject it to the
24
regulation of law."
The Ohio court was likewise reluctant to tread upon an
unknown field;
"The law recognizes no correlative rights in respect to
the underground water percolating, oozing, or filtering
through* the earth, and this mainly. ..because the exist-
ence, origin, movement, and course of such waters, and
the causes which govern and direct their movements, are
so secret, occult, and concealed that an attempt to
administer any set of legal rules in respect to them
would be involved in hopeless uncertainty, and would be,
25
therefore practically impossible."
Having in mind the above water cases and having in mind
the history and temperament of the early days of oil devel-
opment, the failure of American courts to recognize correl-
ative rights from the beginning is understandable. If, after
centuries of experience with a substance so vital as water,
the physical facts of its nature were unknown, it could
hardly be expected that the physical facts of this new and
more mysterious liquid would be learned in a short time.
So, the decisions building up the law of the nature of the
landowner's interest were based "....upon the physical and
economic facts of oil and gas as they /the Judges/ knew
26
them. n<o a o o
24. Chatfield v. Wilson, 28 Vt. 49 (1855).
25. Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio 294, 310 (1861).
26. 1 Summers Oil & Gas. 175, §63 (perm. ed. 1954).
13.

As far as the physical facts were concerned, the follow-
ing classic quotations, although sometimes eloquent, have
common denominators of uncertainties or errorss
"The proof shows that the oil was drawn from a stream
27
or current flowing underground, and reached by the pump.."
"The discovery of petroleum led to a new form of leasing
land. Its fugitive and wandering existence within the
limits of a particular tract was uncertain, and assum-
ed certainty only by actual development founded upon
28
experience."
"Oil and gas move through the interstitial spaces or




... oil. ..becomes. ..the property of the person in whose
well it came... this is so whether the oil moves, per-
30
colates or exists in pools and deposits."
"Petroleum oil is a fluid in the porous sandrock of the
earth. In some instances it doubtless exists in pools,
but where are the pools located? They may be under
the lands in which the well is drilled or. ..in the
31
abutting or remote lands."
"oil. ..is of a fluctuating, uncertain, fugitive nature,
lies at unknown depths, and the quantity, extent and
27. Hail v. Reed, 54 Ky. 383, 387 (1854).
28. Brown v. Vandergrift, 80 Pa. 142, 147 (1875).
29. Hague V. Wheeler, 27Atl. 714,719, 157 Pa. 327, 85 A.L.R.
1156 (1893).
30. Kelly v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio 317, 47 N.E. 399,
401 (1897).




trend of its flow is uncertain."
"... .fugitive minerals, oil and gas, while at large
beneath the surface of the earth, are not... the
33
subject of private ownership."
And, as late as 1925:
"••••oil in its normal state is of a fugitive nature,
restlessly and ceaselessly moving about in the bowels
of the earth in response to natural forces and in-
fluences which have never been fathomed or mastered by
34
human science..."
Now, of course, with wisdom of hindsight, it is recog-
nized that the courts were unduly concerned about oil's
location and in error about its propensity for roaming
35
through the undersoil.
The early economic climate in the oil and gas industry
had no room for conservation measures,, Uses for "mineral
oil", "Seneca oil" and "Rock oil' were rather limited. At
first the oil was used primarily for illumination and med-
icinal purposes. Soon after it came to be used for lubric-
ation. From a paper by Timothy Alden called, "Antiques and
32. Acme Oil & Mining Co. v. Williams, 140 Cal. 681, 74
P. 296,297 (1903).
33. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. V. Sailings Heirs, 150 La. 756,
91 So. 207, 212 (1922).
34. Texas Pacific Coal and Oil Co. v. Comanche Duke Oil Co.,
274 S.W. 193,194 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
35. Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co. 146 Tex. 575, 210
S.W. 2d 558,561 4 ALR 2d 191 (1948). "In the light of
modern scientific knowledge these early analogies have
been disproven and courts generally have come to recognize
that oil and gas, as commonly found in underground reservoirs,
are securely trapped in a static condition. ..and so remain
until disturbed by penetration from the surface." Cf.
Brown v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 126 Tex. 296, 83 S.W.
2d 935, 940, 87 S.W. 2d 1069, 101 ALR 1392 (1935).
15.

Curiosities of Western Pennsylvania'', published in 1820,
comes the following?
"This oil is much esteemed for its efficacy in remov-
ing rheumatic complaints,, It burns well in lamps,
and might be advantageously used in lighting streets.
If, by some process, it could be rendered inodorous,
it would become an important article for domestick
36
illumination."
Henry Ford's mass production of the internal combustion
horseless carriage was almost a half century away when Drake
brought in his oil well. Space and industrial heating was,
of course, still by wood and coal. Ships were still largely
in sail. For the industry, the period prior to 1900 has been
37
termed as the "shirt losing" period. This is not entirely
apt, as some flourished from the beginning. However it did
take time for the industry to settle down to the task of the
38
creation of a petroleum economy.
The last half of the nineteenth century was a time for
grabbing the riches in the land and the land itself. Fron-
tiers were becoming further away and harder to find. The
land rushes, the gold rush of "49, to the Comstock Lode in
36. Giddons, Pennsylvania Petroleum 1750-1872. 7 (1947).
37. American Petroleum Institute Quarterly, Centennial
Issue 21 (1959)
38. Clark, The Oil Century. Ch. 7 & 8 (1958) and Schackne
and Drake, Oil for the World. Ch. 1, (1950).
16.

'61, and to the Klondike and Nome in the 90's set the pulse
of the times. Valuable resources, such as timber, were
destroyed to get at more immediately valuable resources.
Self help and the six-shooter were depended upon largely to
settle disputes and were found to be more expeditious than
courts. It was a time of laissez faire and "finders keepers".
39
The strong and the cunning survived. It took a while for
the choking financial power of the corporate giant to catch
up, so individuals dealt upon comparatively even terms.
With this background, the "rule of capture" was bound
to emerge unsullied by any nice refinements relative to
waste and "just and equitable share from the common source
of supply", and to be the dominant force in the correlative
40
rights of landowners.
And so it did.
39. Glasscock, Then Came Oil„ 257
(1938).
40. Oil was truly trapped and captured along Oil Creek in Pennsy-
lvania in 1807. "The mode of collecting it is this: the
place where it is found bubbling up in the creek is surround-
ed by a wall or dam to a narrow compass, a man then takes
a blanket, flannel, or other woolen cloth, to which the
oil adheres, and spreading it over the surface of the enclos-
ed pond, presses it down a little, draws it up, and running
the cloth through his hands, squeezes out the oil into a
vessel prepared for that purpose; thus twenty or thirty
gallons of pure oil can be obtained in two or three days




Rights protected before Ohio Oil Co p y fl Indiana
"The good old rule, the simple plan,
That he may take who has the power.
And he shall keep who can."
So the rule of capture has been described in a rather
41
impassioned criticism of it. Very early, however, it
was settled that the season on this substance often compared
to wild game was not an entirely open one. In a Kentucky
42
case, the defendants trespassed on plaintiff's land and
used his oil well to get three barrels of oil (then worth $1.
25 per gallon). In resisting an action of detinue to recover
the oil, defendants likened the oil to an underground stream
of water. They conceded that they had trespassed but urged
that P had never reduced this non-unique substance to his
possession and therefore it wasn't his. The court, with some
difficulty, rejected this argument, holding that by having
a well the plaintiff had devised a receptacle for its cap-
ture sufficient to reduce it to his possession and property.
Thus a rule of property, of sorts, was established. In re-
cognizing a difference between water and oil, the court
stated:
"Then besides the fact that water is not oil, and that
while nature furnishes the former almost everywhere, for
the common use of man, as being a universal necessity,
41. Pettenqill. Slio^^Screen 96 (1940). For a scholarly
review of the rule, see Hardwicke, The Rule of Capture and
Its Implications as Applied to Oil and Gas. 13 Texas L.
Rev. 391 (1935). See also Kuntz, The Law of Capture . 10
Okla. L. Rev. 406 (1957).
42. Hail v. Reed, 54 Ky„ 383 (1854).
18.

she furnishes the later, for the most part, only as
the result of arduous labor and intricate processes,
43
and but rarely procures it in its perfect state...."
While this case by no means settled the nature of the land-
owner's interest in oil and gas, it did express the ration-
ale that one .should be rewarded for his enterprise—which
was not forgotten, even if not articulated, in cases to
follow.
States then proceeded to build rules regarding the nat-
ure of the landowner's interest in gas and oil. Two classic
theories were developed. One was that the landowner had no
ownership of the oil and gas in place, but it became his
absolutely after he had acquired possession of it. This is
referred to as the "non-ownership" theory. Another was that
the overlying landowner owned all of the gas and oil in place
under his soil. This was called the "ownership" theory. The
later theory presented a logical difficulty in resolution with
the rule of capture. If A was the owner of all the oil and
gas that he could reduce to his possession, what was the sta-
tus of the oil and gas that probably came from his neighbor,
B's land, when B was the absolute owner of all beneath his
land? Stated otherwise and rhetorically, if B was the owner
of all the oil and gas under his land, what manner of leger-
demain was it that made it A's property by his simple act of
capture?
The rule of capture, however, transcended these classic




theories of ownership of the mineral estate. The "non-
ownership" states found the rule of capture easy to come
by as there was no property interest in the oil and gas
45
until it was reduced to possession. In the "ownership"
46
states, such as Ohio, the rationale of the rule of cap-
ture was a "now you see it now you don't" sort of thing.
The owner had title to all oil and gas in place beneath
his lands, but, when it was drained off, he lost title.
The doctrine of correlative rights, prior to the case
of Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana , made virtually no inroads upon
the full swath of the rule of capture. Courts did not reject
correlative rights as an equitable consideration. At the
same time they would not temper their decisions with them—
other than to suggest that correlative rights might receive
some protection, should the legislatures chose to speak out
against waste and injury to property.
No waste., no boundary crowding . The case that is
44. For a listing of states following either "ownership" or
non-ownership" theories, see Andrews, Correlative Rights
Doctrine in the Law of Oil and Gas. 13 So. Cal. L„ Rev.
185, 189 (1940).
45. Jones v. Forest Oil Co., 194 Pa. 379, 44 Atl. 10J4, 1075
(1900): "If possession of the land is not necessarily poss-
ession of the oil and gas, is there any reason why an oil
and gas operator should not be permitted to adopt any and
all appliances known to the trade to make production of his
wells as large as possible?" Cf. Greenshields v. Warren
Petroleum Corp., 248 F. 2d 61, (10th. Cir. 1957), cert ,
den., 355 U.S. 907. Here 0klahoma°s "non-ownership" rule
was recognized.
46. Kelly v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio 317, 49 N.E. 399, 401 (1893):
"...it forms a part of that tract of land in which it tar-
ries for the time being, and, if it moves to the next ad-
joining tract, it becomes part and parcel of that tract;...
and it is raised to the surface, and then for the first
time it becomes the subject of distinct ownership, separate
from the realty...." Cf. Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co.,
146 Tex. 575, 210 S.W. 2d 558 (1948).
20.

uncomplicated by any senseless waste or appearance of
crowding of boundaries does not, on its facts, arouse much
apathy for the unrestrained rule of capture. Such was an
47
early Indiana case. Here, the Gas Company had a gas well
on a lot in the City of Greenfield. The plaintiffs had
some adjoining lots upon which there were no wells. Noth-
ing in the case report indicates that the plaintiffs had
any intention of drilling for gas on their property. The
court decided that the fact that the shooting of the gas
well with nitroglycerin was likely to increase the flow of
gas from under Ps' lots to D's gas well was no cause for
injunctive relief.
Boundary crowding. In the case of Kelly v. Ohio Oil
48
Co. the defendant corporation, unlike the gas company
in the Indiana case, had plenty of acreage to work with.
It had large acreage under lease on two sides of Kelly's
property line The plaintiff alleged that the custom was
that wells were to be placed 200' distant from property
lines. However, D was in the process of marching his wells
in a row along the property lines, just 25' away from the
boundary. It appeared that the only purpose of drilling
the wells so close to the boundary was to extend the drain-
age area across the boundary. The court refused to grant an
injunction, pointing out that there was no certain knowledge
49
of where the oil was coming from. The court also consid-
ered it intolerable that one should be compelled to submit
47. Peoples Gas CoTvT Tyner, 131 Ind. 277, 31 N.E. 59 (1892).
48. 57 Ohio 317, 49 N.E. 399 (1893).
49. Id. at 401.
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to a court of equity or his neighbor for what they might
50
think was a reasonable use of property,,
Injury as a weapon in bargaining. Upon examination of
51
the Pennsylvania case of Hague y t Wheeler, the seamier side
of the rule of capture begins to show. Here, D drilled a
gas well on his property at the suggestion and request of P,
a gas company. There had been an arrangement between P and
D whereby D had indicated that it might buy the well or pro-
duction of P. D was unable to dispose of his gas in commer-
cial quantities. Negotiations for sale to P were unsuccessful.
D, therefore, let the gas from his well escape into the air.
This threatened to reduce the ultimate flow of P's wells so
P entered and capped D°s well, P next obtained an injunction
prohibiting D from removing the cap<, In granting the injunc-
tion, the lower court had declared that no owner should be
permitted to carry on his operations in reckless or lawless
irresponsibility, but must submit to such limitations as are
necessary to enable each to get his own This judicial esp-
ousel of correlative responsibilities and rights was short-
lived „ It was reversed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
and the injunction dissolved*
The Supreme Court reasoned that if the gas could be put
to some useful or profitable purpose by D, it was his privi-
lege to do so. The Court saw no alteration of the owner's
absolute domain over the gas by the fact that D could not or
did not profitably dispose of it. The Court exemplified;
50. SeeTetti v. Kessler, 54 Ohio 73, 42 N„E. 765 (1896).
51. 157 Pa. 324, 27 Atl. 714 (1893)
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A owns a saw mill. His neighbor B stacks up good wood that
could profitably be used by A and burns it on his own land,
B's act is entirely lawful. "The power of the owner of the
timber over it is neither greater nor less because of his
52
neighbor's readiness and ability to market it." The ex-
ample is poorly drawn, as it begs the issue. In the case of
the timber, there is no lawful way for A to take B's timber
without B's consent. But A could, by a gas well on his own
land, take gas from a reservoir underlying B's. Why? Be-
cause the nature of the substance and because the rule of
capture says sol This lays bare the correlativity in the
rule of capture itself. Capture jj a correlative right.
The rub comes in the dimension—in fitting the right(s) into
an equitable and symmetrical mosaic which portrays both re-
ward to the enterprising and deterrent to the ruthless.
The language of the court does not fit in such a por-
53
traits
"...so long as he can reach it and bring it Zgaj;/
to the surface it is his absolutely, to sell, to
use, to give away or to squander....'"
And then?
"In the disposition he may make of it he is subject
to two limitations? he must not disregard his obliga-
tion to the public, he must not disregard his neigh-
bor's rights."
52. JJ. at 719.
53. Id. at 720.
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As far as protection to the public was concerned, the court
felt that waste prevention policy should come from the
legislature. And, as far as the neighbor's rights were
concerned, the court apparently would have required some
injury to the neighbor* s property that was more identifiable
than the loss of profits.
Judicial Approval of Economic Waste. When a state saw
fit to forbid specific acts of waste by legislation, the
judiciary had little difficulty in upholding the conserva-
tion measure as a proper exercise of the police power. So,
54
in Indiana, in Townsend v. State
ff
the conviction and fine
of $1.00 and costs for violation of the statute forbidding
the burning of a flambeau gas light was upheld.
Without such legislation, however, the Pennsylvania
55
court as much as gave its blessing to economic waste.
Here, the defendant company used a gas pump on each of its
wells in the then near depleted McCurdy Oil Field in Pennsy-
lvania. Among the court's findings of fact were: (1) the
gas pumps increased the flow of gas and oil in D's wells,
(2) use of a pump by one operator necessitated use of pumps
by all operators in the immediate neighborhood, if they
desired to prevent the daily production of their wells from
being decreased, (3) P's production decreased when D used
pumps and came back to normal when D shut off his pumps,
(4) if pumps are placed on all the wells the production
of the wells is neither increased nor diminished (sich and
54. 147 Ind. 624, 47 N.E. 19 (1897).
55. Jones v. Forest Oil Co., 194 Pa. 379,44 At I. 1074 (1900).
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(5) pumps cost $50 to $60.
The court denied the requested injunction, reciting that
the defendant's lawful right to exploit couldn't be curtailed
to prevent his neighbor from loss. Based upon the above
findings, if one landowner who had access to the common
source of supply decided upon a quicker rate of recovery,
it behooved his neighbors to make the same decision. The
ultimate recovery of wealth would not be any greater, and
56
they would all be poorer by the price of the pumps.
Such was the law prior to Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana.
As will be seen, this decision was to render no sudden
metamorphosis in the doctrine of correlative rights, but
it did encourage a change in philosophy in regard to the
nature and scope of the rights protected.
56. The words of the Supreme Court of California, in over-
turning the rule of capture, as it related to underground
water, sound appropriate here: "...They will have abso-
lutely no protection in law against others having stronger
pumps, deeper wells, or a more favorable situation, who can
thereby take from them unlimited quantities of the water,
reaching to the entire supply, and without regard to the
place of use. We cannot perceive how a doctrine offering
so little protection to the investments in and product of
such enterprises, and offering so much temptation to others
to capture the water on which they depend, can tend to
promote developments in the future or preserve those al-
ready made...." Katz v. Walkinshaw, J41 Cal. 116, 70 P.
663, 74 P. 766 (1903). Compare! Frazier v. Brown, 12
Ohio 294, 311 (1861) "Because any such recognition of
correlative rights, would interfere* to the material de-
triment of the common wealth, with drainage and agricul-
ture, mining, the construction of highways and railroads,
with sanitary regulations, building and the general progress
of improvement in works of embellishment and utility."
25.

Rights protected—Ohio Oil Co„ v
ft
Indiana and after.,
Around the turn of the century, there was a large
active "gas belt" in Eastern Central Indiana situated over
a large Trenton rock gas and oil reservoir. The state
brought an action against the Ohio Oil Company, inter alia,
to enjoin them from continuing to allow gas to escape from
their oil wells that were drawing from the reservoir. The
action was brought under a statute forbidding the acts
complained of. The defendant company showed how it had
openly invested much money in the oil business in this area,
how oil was more valuable than gas, how oil would be of
value to the community, and how it had used skill to get the
oil and was only using ordinary methods to recover it.
The State, on the other hand, showed how defendant's
practices were depleting the reservoir pressure, how the
gas belt was supporting State Institutions and providing
cheap fuel for manufacturing purposes, and how the gas was
generally adding wealth to the State and weal of the public.
In upholding the injunction, Mr e Justice White, for
the Court, saw it lawful to drill in any part of the re=
servoir, even though it meant that the entire volume of gas
and oil would in some measure be decreased thereby. But,
he observed, if there be no power to prevent any waste, any-
one with the right to drill would have the "...unrestrained
license to waste the entire contents of the reservoir by
allowing the gas to be drawn off and to be dispersed.. ..with-
57
out use or benefit to anyone."
57. 177 U.S. 190, 201 (1900).
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Mr Justice White next observed it was doubtful that
people could be entirely divested of their rights to take
gas and oil—as they could with ferae naturae. However,
he saw this right to take limited:
"But there is a co-equal right in them all to take
from a common source of supply. ... It follows from
the essence of their right ooe .that the use by one of
his power to seek to convert a part of the common
fund to actual possession may result in an undue pro-
portion being attributed to One of the possessors of
the right, to the detriment of others, or by waste by
one or more, to the annihilation of the rights of the
58
remainder,,"
What was said, as well as what was unsaid, is of import here.
It was declared that landowners have a co-equal and restrict-
ed right to exploit and that this right was of sufficient
strength to justify legislation prohibiting activity that
was other wise lawful. It does^not declare that, but for
the legislation, there would be no co-equal rights,,
As the need developed in the eyes of the legislatures,
the scope and detail of restriction expanded, tracing a
decreasing spiral which marked the newly defined periphery
of the rule of capture. So a Wyoming statute prohibiting
59
the manufacture of carbon black was upheld. A California
58. Id. at 209.
59. Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300 (1920). "A
state may consider the relation of rights and accomodate
their coexistence, and in the interest of the community,
limit one that others may be enjoyed." Jd at 315.
27.

statute was upheld which forbade "unreasonable waste of
natural gas", even though the test of reasonableness was
60
given to an administrative body a Proration orders based
61 62
upon daily market and ratable production, forced pooling,
63
and price fixing along with a formula for ratable taking
were tested and upheld by way of recognition of correlative
rights as a subject justifying legislation
With Ohi,p Oil CoA v„.... Indian a as a touchstone, and be-
fore the advent of widespread comprehensive legislation on
the subject, a few courts were able, with an equitable app-
roach and with the help of well pleaded facts, to curtail
encroachments upon correlative rights without the crutch
of a statute. One of the cases arose in the same area as
64
did the Ohio Oil Co. case Here the plaintiffs, a
group of manufacturers, had extensive interests in the
Indiana gas belt. The plaintiffs were using the gas to
furnish their factories and to sell to many homes in the
area which were heated with gas. The defendants were en-
gaged in selling gas to the Chicago area (some 200 miles
distant) and they were tapping the same reservoir as the
plaintiffs. The defendants had put in two pumping stations
which assisted them in a rapid recovery of the gas. They
60. Bandini Co. v. Superior Ct. 284 U.S. 8
61. Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission, 285 U.S.
210 (1931).
62. Hunter Company, Inc. V. McHugh, 320 U S 222 (1943).
63. Cities Service Gas Co. v Peerless Oil and Gas, 340 U.S.
179 (1950).
64. Manufacturers Gas and Oil Co. v. Indiana Gas & Oil Co.,
155 Ind. 461, 57 N.E. 912 (1900).
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were threatening to put in another pumping station in the
immediate area and had leased thousands of acres there.
It was shown that the pressure in the reservoir had dimin-
ished from 325 psi in 1886 to 165 in 1900. Salt water
intrusion was feared when the pressure reached 100 psi.
It was also shown that it would be very expensive to con-
vert the factories and homes to the use of coal. The pray-
er asked that the defendants be enjoined from using any
pumping devices that would have the effect of increasing the
natural flow of the gas. The court reckoned that the cor-
relative right to take from the common reservoir was use-
less under the circumstance where one party had such an
advantage, and granted the injunction. This decision was
a courageous disavowal of the unlimited rule of capture.
It would have been more facile to suggest that the plain-
tiffs also use pumps. Yet, the court surely felt, this
would have been an invitation to increase the depletion of
this valuable resource, to the detriment of those who found
themselves living in close proximity to it.
Malicious waste prompted the Kentucky court to enjoin
withdrawal from the common source of supply, in a case that
65
closely followed. Here, the Louisville Gas<Company was
getting competition from the Kentucky Heating Company in its
business of supplying natural gas to Louisville. The former
company caused a corporation to be formed (with money from
65. Louisville Gas Co. v. Kentucky Heating Co., 117 Ky. 71,
77 S.W„ 368 (1903). See also Commonwealth v. Trent 117
Ky. 34, 77 S.W. 390 (1903).
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officers of the Louisville Gas Co.) which bought up leases
on the land in the environs of Kentucky Heating Company's
wells. This new corporation succeeded in getting some good
gas wells. Gas was fed to a lampblack factory day and night
for five months. During this time the gas pressure of
Kentucky Heating Company was reduced from 60 to 30 lbs.
Such an unconscionable waste, found to be prompted by the
motive of destroying the Kentucky Heating Company, was de-
clared to be the proper subject of injunction, independently
66
of the waste statute.
The Louisiana Court granted relief to one whose neigh-
bor stubbornly refused to plug his abandoned well, which
said well allowed air to get in the plaintiff's pump, making
67
it inefficient. The court went deep into the stems of
the Civil law and concluded that the simple fact of neighbor-
hood imposed certain limitations upon the faculties inherent
66. "While natural gas is not the subject of ownership, the
owner of the soil must, in dealing with it, use his own
property with due regard to the rights of his neighbor.
He cannot be allowed deliberately to waste the supply for
the purpose of injuring his neighbor....A man is only
allowed to make a reasonable use of those natural supplies
which are for the common benefit of all...." Louisville Gas
Co. v. Kentucky Heating Co., 117 Ky. 71,77 S.W. 368, 369 (1903),
On the damage phase of the case at 132 Ky. 435, 111 S.W.
374 (1908), it was held that the lower court used the wrong
method in treating the waste as a conversion. Kentucky
being a "non<=ownership" state, the damages should have been
for "the value in money for the diminution of the natural
flow of the gas at the wells..." (376-377) 67. Higgins




in ownership, "...and this is the reciprocal interest of the
68
owners." Although the court was clearly persuaded by the
right of an owner to conduct any lawful operations on his
own land, it could not permit the continuance of an act that
was not beneficial to the actor, but merely harmful to his
neighbor. *
Two Michigan cases are very strong in their recognition
of common law correlative rights---one to the point of re-
quiring an allocation of production on the theory of conver-
69
sion. In another case, the Michigan court had announced
that it would require an accounting in the event that an adj-
oining landowner could not drill for oil on his land as a
70
result of a use restriction.
The beacon of Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana did not lead all
down the same path, however. The Pennsylvania court in Bar-
71
nard v„ Mononqahela Natural Gas Company
,
apparently did not
68. Jd. at 236, 82 So. at 209.
69. Ross v. Damm, 278 Mich. 388, 270 N.W. 722 (1936). Cf. 294
Mich. 103, 292 N.W. 579 (1940).
70. Quinn v. Pere Marquette Ry. Co., 256 Mich. 143, 239 N.W.
376. Cf. Central Land Co. v. City of Grand Rapids, 302
Mich. 105, 4 N.W. 2d 485 (1942).
71. 216 Pa. 362, 65 Atl. 801 (1907). Cf. Brown v. Humble 126
Tex. 296, 83 S W. 2d 935 (1935) and Gain v. South Penn Oil
Co., 76 W. Va. 769, 86 S.E. 883 (1915).
31.

consider the Ohio Oil Company case as a recognition of cor-
relative rights that existed either with or without legisla-
tion. On the contrary, the rule of capture was accorded a
status which clothed it with immunity from equitable consid-
erations:
"...every landowner or his lessee may locate his wells
wherever he pleases, regardless of the interest of
others. He may distribute them over the whole farm or
locate them on one part of it. He may crowd the adjoin-
ing farms so as to enable him to draw the oil and gas
from them. What then can the neighbor do? Nothing;
only go and do likewise. ...this may not be the best
rule; but neither the Legislature nor our highest court
has given us any better. No doubt many thousands of
dollars have been expended in protecting lines in oil
and gas territory that would not have been expended if
some rule had existed by which it could have been avoid-
72
ed."
As will be seen later, the legislatures have seen to it that
courts do not have to choose between the difficult and equit-
able approach followed by the Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana,
and Michigan courts and the "hands off" approach which the
Pennsylvania court reluctantly announced. This is fortun-
ate in that the natures of the subject matters of prevent-
ion of waste and adjustment of correlative rights are more




susceptible of equitable regulation and supervision by an
administrative body designed for that purpose, than by a
court. The task of determining whether an administrative
body has acted within the terms of the statute and in fur-
therance of legislative policy is, by itself, a large one.
Therefore, there has been an unwillingness to give liberal
construction to existing regulations in order to reach an
equitable result.
73
For example, in a California case, the plaintiffs were
conducting a large voluntary unit operation in Kern County.
The defendants were operating on the same structure and had
refused to be a part of the unit (Superior had apparently
asked for an equity that was considered excessive). There
was no compulsory unitization statute. The reservoir con-
tained a condensate area and a so-called black oil area.
The plaintiffs demonstrated how a decrease in pressure would
cause retrograde condensation and loss of recoverable hydro-
carbons. Further, solution gas was needed to remain in the
black oil for the purpose of drive. The plaintiffs had
built a cycling plant which helped maintain the pressure.
The defendants had not joined in this recycling program,
but were benefiting from it. The plaintiffs pointed out
that they were reluctant to follow the same wasteful prac-
tices as were the defendants, but would have to, if the
defendants were not forced to join the unit plan.
The prayer for relief was a complicated thing which
73. Western Gulf Oil Co. v. Superior Oil Co., 92 Cal. App.
2d 299, 206 P. 2d 944 (1949).
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would have required the court to set up a unit operation and
adjudicate the equities of everyone in it. In denying the
relief the court recognized that the "right of an individual
to operate as he pleases in extracting oil and gas from his
own land is being subjected to increasing control and limit-
ation in the interest of the public and of correlative over-
74
lying owners." but would not extend the intendment of the
waste statute to cover forced unitization. To the same
effect, the Arkansas court would not expand the statute
75
providing for voluntary unitization to require a unit
operation even when all of the operators wanted the plan
and all but royalty interests calculated at .003004% desired
76
the plan. A pertinent part of the case which demonstrated
the vitality of the doctrine of correlative rights was the
royalty owners' demand for royalties for the entire amount
of oil recovered during the invalidated unit operation.
It happened that the well on the plaintiff's land was an
output well which produced more under the unit operation
than it would have been allowed otherwise. Referring to
their lease, which was then the valid operating document,
the plaintiffs urged that they were entitled to royalties from
all oil produced from their well. A rote application of the
rule of capture would have supported this proposition. How-
ever, the court observed:
"There is no equity in the appellants' insistence
74. Jd. at 949.
75. Ark. Stat. Ann. §53-101 et e seq.
76. Dobson v. Arkansas Oil & Gas Commission, 218 Ark. 160,
235 S.W. 2d 33 (1950). See also Wood Oil Co. v. Corp.
Commission, 205 Okla. 537, 239 P. 2d 1023 (1950).
34.

that they should share in the fruits of unitization
while being relieved of its burdens, those burdens being
an immediate reduction in royalties for the sake of
77
greater returns over a period of years.
Common lessee cases. There are a group of cases, here-
in called "common lessee cases" which serve to discredit
the supremacy of the dominion of the rule of capture in
the arena of conflicting interests of overlying landowners.
These cases concern the rights of adjoining landowners who
happen to have the same lessee. This is no uncommon event.
But for the common agency of the same lessee the landowners
would be facing each other across the line fence, watching
for the next offensive move and girding themselves for the
next defensive move of capture, i.e., of going and doing
78
likewise. Even in Barnard v. Mononqahela Natural Gas
Company where the remedy of self help was announced, it was
realized that the granting of the leases by the landowners
to a common lessee did, by contract, divest them of this
remedy. The capturing was left up to the lessee. His in-
terests were not always in harmony with development of both
properties—especially if he could recover the valuable
product in a single or a few operations. Therefore, it
was announced that a common lessee may not fraudulently or
evasively drill wells so as to drain one lessor's property,
to the detriment of others. This phase of the case, con-
77. Dobson v. Arkansas Oil & Gas Commission, 218 Ark. 160,
235 S.W. 2d 33,37 (1950).




cerning the protection of the landowner's privilege to con-
duct his operations so as to obtain a fair share of the
underlying wealth has been cited more than the "go and do
79
likewise" phase.
The privilege to conduct operations (or have them
conducted) so as to obtain a fair share is of some substance
when it has the vigor and resilience to sidestep an express
covenant and to overcome the implication that the complain-
ing landowner's interests were satisfied by the acceptance
80
of delay rentals.
In the case referred to, Phillips was the lessee of
the plaintiff and also leased the adjoining land. Phillips
brought in producing wells within 570', 1300' and 580' of
the plaintiff's land. The lease required offset wells when
producers were drilled within 150 feet. While plaintiff
had accepted delay rentals, Phillips was notified that
plaintiff's land was being drained and protection was de-
manded against depletion. It was held that there was no
implied covenant of development because of the express cov-
enant to offset. Therefore there was no duty to offset.
79. Lamp v. Locke, 89 W. Va. 138, 108 S.E. 889 (1921). (Here
a mandatory injunction required the lessee to drill an
offset well when he conspired with adjoining owner to
draw off all gas by a well 5' from the line.), Trimble v.
Hope Natural Gas Co., 113 W. Va. 839, 169 S.E. 529 (1933),
Dillard v. United Fuel Gas Co., 114 W. Va. 684, 173 S.E.
573 (1934), Warfield Natural Gas Co. v. Allison, 248 Ky.
646, 59 S.W. 2d 534 (1933), and Plains Petroleum Corp. v.
Fine, 174 Okla. 570, 51 P. 2d 284 (1935).
80, Millette v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 209 Miss. 687, 48 So.
2d 344 (1950), 221 Miss. 1, 72 So. 2d 176 (1954), and 74
So. 2d 731 (1954).
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However, it was announced that it was the public policy of
the State to protect correlative rights and that there was
an implied covenant that the lessee would not do anything
to impair the value of the complaining lessor's lease. The
lessee was burdened with the duty to use reasonable care to
protect the lessor from damage or loss by his affirmative
act: "The equitable duty, existing as well under implicat-
ion, to conserve the mineral resources of lessors or to re-
81
frain from depletory acts survives unimpaired." Further-
more, the acceptance of delay rentals didn't destroy the
82
lessee's equitable duty, and the injured landowner was
entitled to damages for the lost royalty, even though this
would be tantamount to a payment of a double royalty.
It should be noted that the chain of correlativity
is broken in this case in that the gain of the complaining
landowner would not always redound to the detriment of the
adjoining landowner. However, it is to be expected that
the disinclination of the lessee to pay double royalty
would motivate an equitable development of both tracts,
with an end result tending to satisfy the complaining land-
owner.
81. Id. at 690, 48 So. 2d 344 (1950)
82. Contra: Hutchins v. Humble Oil & Refining co., 161 S.W.
2d 571 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) and Coats v. Brown, 301 S.W,
2d 932 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957). Also, where lease required
notice as a condition precedent to any required action by
the lessee to prevent damage by drainage, lessor could not
collect damage without giving the notice, where no conceal-
ment was involved. Billeaud Planters, Inc. v. Union Oil




The Millette case is not an isolated one. While the
study of the relationships involved is in the subject mat-
84
ter of implied covenants, it has incisive relevancy here,
as the forces of law place upon the lessee the duty to attempt
to obtain for each of his lessors a proportionate share from
the common sdurce.
Tortious invasi ons of the rights protected.
Examples of tortious invasions of the rights protected
do, insofar as they broaden the spectrum of prohibited
activity, assist in the understanding of correlative rights.
85
The prohibited conduct ranges from trespass, through neg-
86
ligence per se as imposed by statute, and conduct pro-
hibited by an administrative body such as the Railroad
87 88
Commission, to simple negligence.
Once a property interest in the common source of supply
is established, it follows that the common law rules relative
83. See also: Kleppner v. Lemon, 176 Pa. 502, 35 A. 109
(1896) and 198 Pa. 581,48 At \. 483 (1901), Hartman Ranch
Co. v. Associated Busseyville Oil & Gas Co., 180 Ky. 545,
203 S.W. 515 (1918), Carper v. United Fuel Gas Co., 78 W.
Va. 433, 89 S.E. 12, (1916), Indian Territory Illuminating
Oil Co. v. Haynes Drilling Co., 180 Okla. 419, 69 P. 2d
624 (1937), and Blair v. Clear Creek Oil & Gas Co., 148
Ark. 301, 230 S.W. 286 (1921).
84. See Merrill, Permitted Drainage. 4 Okla. L. Rev. 58 (1951).
85. Alphonzo E. Bell Corporation v. Bell View Oil Syndicate,
24 Cal. App 2d 587, 76 P. 2d 167 (1938).
86. Palmer Corp. v. Collins, 214 Ky. 838, 284 S.W. 95 (1926).
87. Loeffler v. King, 228 S.W. 2d 201 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950),
reversed on other grounds at 149 Tex. 626, 236 S.W. 2d
772 (1951). Thus drainage brought about by drilling a
well at a closer distance than that allowed by the Rail-
road Commission is wrongful capture, and damages may be
recovered.
88. Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 146 Tex. 575, 210 S.W. 2d
558 (1948). For a query as to the basis for damages in
such cases, see Masterson, Legal Position of the Drilling
Contractor, First Annual Institute on Oil & Gas Law, South-
western Legal Foundation, 183, 212 (1949).
38.

to trespass apply. The trespass may take place above the
89
ground, as in Hail v. Reed, where the defendants, by
stealth, came on the plaintiff's land and dipped some oil
out of his well, or below the ground, by the means of slant
90
drilling.
If the conservation statutes call for certain acts,
such as plugging a well, and harm results from the forbid-
den act or omission, such as harm by water intrusion, the




The Loeffler v. King type of case results in an award
of damages to the landowner who complains that he was in-
jured by some act in violation of the Commission's order or
regulation. So, when one uses a vacuum pump in violation of
the Railroad Commission's order, the injured party is entit-
93
led to damages. This result not only serves as a deter-
rent to the violation of such orders or regulations, but it
places a more visible tag of archaism upon the rule of cap-
ture as a dominant force in the conflict of interests in
the common source of supply.
89. 54 Ky. 383 (1854).
90. Alphonzo E 8 Bell Corp. v. Bell View Oil Syndicate, supra
note 85.
91. Palmer Corp. v. Collins, supra note 86. Sometimes, how-
ever, the conduct is tested in juxtaposition with reason-
ability or prudence, even though the conduct is prohibited
by statute. See Atkinson v. Virginia Oil & Gas Co., 72
W. Va. 707, 79 S.E. 647 (1913).
92. Op. cit. supra note 87.





The Elliff v. Texon Drilling Go. case is well known
for its holding that the law of capture is no refuge when
one negligently wastes the oil and gas of a common reservoir.
Here the defendant was engaged in drilling an offset to the
Elliff No. 1 gas well in the Aque Dulce Gas Field of Nueces
County, Texas. As a result of a failure to use drilling
mud of sufficient weight, the well blew out, caught fire and
cratered, the later process engulfing and destroying Elliff
No. 1. The court declared that:
"...a reasonable opportunity to produce his fair share
of the oil and gas is the landowner's common law right
95
under our theory of ownership in place."
The court also believed that the triumvirate of the rule of
capture, conservation statutes, and orders of the Railroad
Commission "afford(s) each owner a reasonable opportunity
to produce his proportionate part of the oil and gas from
the entire pool, and to prevent operating practices injur-
96
ious to the common reservoir,/ 9
In addition to damage and/or unnecessary waste proximate-
97 " 98
ly caused by blowouts , shooting , air intrusion from
94. 146 Tex. 575, 210 S.W. 2d 558 (1948). Comments: 27 Texas
U Rev. 349, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 146, 20 Miss L. J. 96, and
2 Vand. L. Rev. 326.
95. Eliff. v. Texon Drilling Co., 146 Tex. 575, 210 S.W. 2d
558 (1948).
96. Id.
97. See Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270
P. 952 (1928), and In re Deep Rock Oil Corp., 16 F. Supp.
777 (D.C. Okla. 1936).
98. Comanche Duke Oil Co. v. Tex. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 298 S.W.
554 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) and Mner v. U.S. Torpedo Co.,




failure to plug, or water intrusion from failure to
100
plug may form the basis of an action by those who have
101
been injured thereby. In a recent case a lessee's con~
tract right to explore was protected by an action in tort.
The defendant, representing a competitor of the lessee,
conducted seismic tests on the land covered by plaintiff's
lease. The plaintiff was awarded damages in the total sum
of the original consideration which he paid for the lease
and the annual rentals which he had paid. It is question-
able whether this would result in any protection to the
landowner's interest in obtaining a fair and equitable
share of any underlying valuables. It does however, limit
the right of exploration, a necessary prelude to exploitation.
Louisiana at one time refused damages for the gradual
exhaustion of the common reservoir when the defendant drill-
102
ed his gas well in such a manner as to cause it to blow out.
While the facts showed that 10 million cubic feet of gas
was escaping daily, the court felt that it was impossible
to assess damages. This was apparently prompted by the
inability to determine how much of the daily waste came
from the plaintiff's portion of the reservoir and the
Hague v. Wheeler rationale that if such an amount of gas
were being taken properly from the reservoir, the plaintiff
99. Higgins Oil & Fuel Co. v. Guaranty Oil Co., 145 La. 233,
82 So. 206 (1919). Cf. Nisbet v. Van Tuyl, 241 F. 2d
874 (Ky. 1957).
100. Atkinson v. Virginia Oil & Gas Co., 72 W. Va. 707, 79
S.E. 647 (1913).
101. Tinsley v. Seismic Explorations, Inc. of Del., Ill So.
2d 834, (La. App. 1959).




would have no cause of complaint. It was held, however,
that the plaintiff in such cases would be entitled to an
injunction to enjoin the waste and abate the private nui-
sance.
Another Louisiana case that was in litigation for a
long period of time, at last resulted in a holding that
103
damages could be recovered. In the first case land-
owners within a mile radius joined together as plaintiffs
and alleged that as a result of defendant's negligence his
gas well in Richland parish blew out. Specific acts of
negligence, such as using old pipe, violation of safety
regulations, and having drunken drillers in employ, were
set out. The well remained uncontrolled for 1165 days.
The plaintiffs asked for damages based upon damage to the
reservoir and based upon the estimated amounts of their
lost royalties. The court wasn't convinced that the acts
were negligent and asserted that the requested damages
were too speculative. Also, since Louisiana was not an
"ownership" in place state, the court was reluctant to
rest any money recovery on the value of uncaptured gas.
Leaving the door open on the question of negligence,
the court suggested a possibility of damages measured by
a depreciation of the land values as a result of defendant's
act. In the 1936 case, the negligence was proven to the
103. McCoy v. Arkansas Natural Gas Co., 175 La 487, 143
So. 383 (1925) and 184 La. 101, 165 So. 632 (1936).
42.

satisfaction of the high court and the case was returned
only because the lower court had not permitted the plain-
tiffs to show their damages, measured by their suggested
method.
Sometimes the alleged tortious invasion is measured
104
by the so-caUed "prudent operator" test. Since that
test is so firmly established in the atmosphere surrounding
the jural relationships between the lessee and the lessor,
it would probably be better to leave it there. The accept-
ed test of negligence, e.g.—how would a reasonable and
prudent man conduct himself in the same or similar circum-
stances?—would suffice here. Besides, the "prudent opera-
tor" as far as his lessor is concerned may not be a reason-
able and prudent man as far as the lessor's neighbor is
concerned.
The "Good Samaritan" doesn't have to guarantee the suc-
cess of his labors. In the Iyey v„ Phillips Petroleum Co.
105
case a wild and abandonned well had blown out and was
cratering between the lands of the plaintiff and the defen-
dant. The defendant volunteered to kill the well, but was
unable to do so. The defendant did not have to respond in
damages to the plaintiff. The court first held that the Tex-
as waste statute was not intended to cover the attempted
killing of a wild well. Also, implicit in the holding, was
that one who volunteers must leave those with claimed injury
in a worse position than they would have been without such
efforts.
104. Larkins-Warr Trust v. Watchorn Petroleum Co., 198 Okla.
12, 174 P. 2d 589 (1946).
105. 36 F. Supp. 811 CD.C. Tex 1941).
43.

lhjLJyjalits_js_Subi ?nd P ef ini tipn
Beyond cavil all laws pertaining to conservation and
prevention of waste have had their effect upon correlative
rightSo Such regulatory measures were designed for the
good of the public when the public need came to be realized,
Well spacing requirements, proration,, and laws relating to
106
unit operations,, both permissive and mandatory, were
bound to and did have a marked effect upon the "just and
equitable share" of each landowner or producer,, It should
be remembered, however, that correlative rights are not the
107
product of such legislations, Probably he reverse is the
108
case Q Nonetheless, the common law doctrine of correlative
rights, in the 60 years since it was given strong recogni-
tion and stature in the Ohio Oil Company v. Indiana ease,,
appears to have been given more practical definition by the
legislatures than by the courts c From an examination of
some of the statutes defining "correlative rights" and "just
and equitable share"", which incorporate some of the complex
details of today u s knowledge of the physical nature of oil
and gas in place, one can come to sympathize with the jud=
icial reluctance to preside over and adjudicate these de=
tails, because of their complexity
109 110 111 112
Alaska, Colorado, Nevada and Utah define
106 o See Hoffman, ^2^tMl^^llI}^§L^BililMiM - (1954)
and Meyers, The L aw_ of_ Pooling,JjdJInjjizaiti on . (1957).
107. 1 Summers Oil & Gas, 190, §63 (perm, ed. 1954)
108. Kulp, Oil & Gas Rights §10.97 (1954).
109. Alaska Comp Laws Ann. 147=7=2 (Cum. Supp. 1958).
110. Colo. Rev. Stat. §100=6=3(13) (1953).
111. Nev. Rev. Stat. 522.010(2) (1957).
112. Utah Code Ann. 40=6~4( i ) (1953).
44,

correlative rights by statute. Of these, Alaska and Nevada
have given the same and most comprehensive definitions
"Correlative rights shall mean the opportunity afford-
ed, so far as practicable to do so, to the owner of
each property in a pool to produce without waste his
just and equitable share of the oil and gas, or both,
in the pools being an amount, so far as can be practic=
ally determined, and so far as can practicably be ob~
tained without waste, substantially in the proportion
that the quantity of recoverable oil or gas, or both
under such property bears to the total recoverable oil
or gas or both in the pool, and for such purposes to
use his just and equitable share of the reservoir en-
ergy "
Colorado would allow each owner and producer an "equal
opportunity" to produce his share and the definition makes
no mention of reservoir energy^
"The term "correlative rights shall mean that each
owner and producer in a common pool or source of sup-
ply of oil and gas shall have an equal opportunity to
obtain and produce his just and equitable share of the
oil and gas underlying such pool or source of supply."
Utah"s definition is very cryptic and is of little
assistance in exploring the doctrines
"The term 'correlative rights means the owners* or
producers" just and equitable share in a pool."
45.

In so far as Utah e s definition would imply that "correla-
tive rights" means common or joint ownership of the oil or
gas, as distinguished from a common right to exploit it,
113
it does not reflect the common law.
New Mexico has, without specifically defining correla-
tive rights, offered standards in the consideration of
114
their protections
"In protecting correlative rights the commission may
give equitable consideration to acreage, pressure,
open flow, porosity, permeability, deliverability and
quality of the gas and to such other pertinent factors
as may from time to time exist, and insofar as is
practicable, shall prevent drainage between producing
tracts in a pool which is not equalized by counter^
drainage/'
Some states have declared the abuse of correlative
rights to be waste Thus, the rule making and enforcement
authority of the conservation agencies comes directly into
115
play in the adjustment of correlative rights. Alabam?,
113. Alphonzo E. Bell Corp. v. Bell View Oil Syndicate, 24
Cal. AP£ . 2d 587, 76 P. 2d 167, 175 (1938), "This prin-
cipal /tnat the owners of all the land embraced within the
boundaries of an oil reservoir between various points in
which the oil may migrate^ own all the oil in that reser-
voir as tenants in commoji/ has no support... That the sur=
face owners have a common and correlative right to take
from such sand strata.. is all that the cases mean when
they speak of extracting. ..from a common source."
114. N.M. Stat. Ann. 65~3~13(c) (1953).
115„ Ala. Code, Title 26 §179(25) I (3) (
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116 117 118 119
Arkansas,, Florida,, Georgia and North Carolina
have the identical provisions
"Abuse of the correlative rights and opportunities of
each owner of oil and gas in a common reservoir due
to non°uniform, disproportionate, and unratable with-
drawal% causing undue drainage between tracts of land
/constitutes waste/."
120 121
To the foregoing standard, Mississippi and Colorado
have addeds
"...or resulting in one or more owners in such pool
producing more than his just and equitable share of
production from such pool. 09
Texas has placed the adjustment of correlative rights
122
in gas under the direction of the Railroad Commission;
*'..oThe Commission shall prorate and regulate such
production for the protection of public and private
interests.. Cb) In the adjustment of correlative
rights and opportunities of each owner of gas in a
common reservoir to produce and use or sell such gas
123
as permitted in this Article."
116. Ark. Stat, Ann. S53-109 IC3) (1947).
117. Fla. Stat. Ann. l377,19(10)(k) (1957).
118. Ga. Laws 1955, No. 366 §7 1(3).
119. N.C. Gen. Stat. §113-389 CDC3) (1952).
120. Miss. Code Ann. §6132-08(k) (3) (1942).
121. Colo. Rev. Stat. §100=6-3(12)^) (1957 Supp.).
122. Tex. Ann. Civ. Stat.„ Art. 6008 §10 (1949).
123. Held to allow proration and regulation of daily gas
well production from each common reservoir. Corzel=
ius v. Harrell, 143 Tex. 5O9 186 S.W. 2d 961 (1945).
47.

Likewise, the Corporation Commission of Kansas is charged
124 125




Other states have given further refinement and prof-
127
fered definitions of "just and equitable share"". Arkansas
128
and North Carolina have the s:
"Subject to the reasonable requirements for prevention
of waste, a producers just and equitable share of the
oil and gas in a pool (also sometimes referred to as a
tract's just and equitable share) is that part of the
authorized production for the pool (whether it be the
total which could be produced without any restriction
on the amount of production, or whether it be an amount
less than that which the pool could produce if no rest-
riction on the amount were imposed) which is substant-
ially in the proportion that the recoverable oil and
gas in the developed area of his tract in the pool bears
to the recoverable oil and gas in the total developed
area of the pool, insofar as these amounts can be as-
certained practically, and to that end, the rules, reg-
ulations, permits and orders of the Division shall be
such as will prevent or minimize reasonably avoidable
net drainage (that is, drainage which is not equalized
by counter drainage), and will give to each producer
124. Kan c Gen St a t c §55=603 C1957 Supp )
125 State Department of Geology and Mineral Industries,
126, Ore. Rev. Stat. 1520.065(1) (1953),
127, Ark, Stat. Ann, §53~114D (1947).
128, N,C, Gen, Stat, §113-392 (1952),
48

the opportunity to use his just and equitable share
of the reservoir energy,"
Cast in a more simplified style, this would appear;
S = just and equitable share
P = authorized production from the pool
1
T - recoverable oil and gas in any portion of tract
*,
T = recoverable oil and gas in entire tract
1 l29
Thus. S - _=JL=- P,
T
To the terms of the foregoing North Carolina and Ark-
130 131
ansas statutes, Alabama and Louisiana have added;
"'In determining each producer s just and equitable
share of the authorized production for the pool, the
board is authorized to give due consideration to the
productivity of the well or wells located thereon, as
determined by flow tests, bottom hole pressure tests,
or any other practical method of testing wells and
producing structures, and to consider such other facts
and geological or engineering tests and data as may be
determined by the supervisor to be pertinent or relevant
129. Query whether if RS were to symbolize reservoir energy,
would RS be the same fraction as S? The Michigan stat-
ute (§13.139 (13) (1958)) apparently anticipates that the
recoverable products and reservoir energy will diminish
in the same proportion all over the tract, M eeo and with-
out reducing bottom hole pressure materially below the
average for the pool, substantially in the proportion
that the quantity of the recoverable oil and gas under
such property bears to the total recoverable oil and gas
in the pool, and for this purpose to use his just and
equitable share of the reservoir energy.,,'" (Emphasis
supplied). Cf. N.M. Stat. Ann. 65,3.14 Ca) (1953».
130. Ala, Code, Tit. 26 §179(35>D (1940).
131. La. Stat. Ann, 30;9D (1950).
49,

to ascertaining each producer's just and equitable share
of the production and reservoir energy of the field or
Thus, those charged with the administration of the Alabama
and Louisiana acts are authorized to use the latest scient-
ific evidence to aid them in arriving at "just and equitable"
132 133
shares, I\ is likewise with Oklahoma,,
In addition to the foregoing, a number of states have
declared it as legislative policy that correlative rights
134
are to be protected,, The Alabama declaration is set forth
as an examples
"In recognition of past, present, and imminent evils
occuring in the production and use of oil and gas, as
a result of waste in the production and use thereof
and as a result of waste in the absence of co-equal or
correlative rights of owners of crude oil or natural
gas in a common source of supply to produce and use
the same, this law is enacted for protection against
such evils and for prohibiting waste and compelling
ratable production,"
132. The State of Alaska°s unitization statute, at §47-7=
7(b) (1958 Cum, Supp„) requires adoption of scientific
knowledge to arrive at a "fair, equi tableland reasonable
share of the unit production*.," So, "c./such share/
shall be measured by the value of each such tract for oil
and gas purposes and its contributing valine to the unit
in relation to like values of other tracts in the unit,
taking into account acreage, the quantity of oil and gas
recoverable therefrom, location on the structure, its
probable productivity of oil and gas in the absence of
unit operations, the burden of operations to which the
tract will or is likely to be subjected, or so many of
said factors, or such other pertinent engineering, geol-
ogical or operating factors, as may be reasonably suscept-
ible of determination."
133. Okla. Stat. Ann, §52-287,4 (b).
134. Ala. Code 1940 §179(24) (Cum. Supp, 1947) ; Ariz. Rev.
50,

Stat. Ann. §27~502(A) (3) (1956); Alaska Com. Laws Ann.
§47=7=6(1) (Cum. Supp. 1958) ; Ark Stat. Ann. §53-101 (1947):
Colo. Rev. Stat §100-6=6(1) (1953) ; Fla. Stat. Ann. §377.06
(1957) ; Kan. Gen. Stat. 1949, 55-603 (1957 Supp.)° Miss.
Code Ann. §6132=01 (1942); N.C. Gen. Stat. §113=382 (1952);
N.D. Laws 1953, Chapt. 227, §2; Okla. Stat. Ann. Title 52,




The following Chart recapitulates the above mentioned
state recognition of correlative rights as the applicable
doctrine in the adjustment of interests involved;
135 136 137 138 139 140
135. Correlative rights defined.
136. Abuse of correlative rights tantamount to waste.
137. Just and equitable share defined.
138. Railroad Commission to adjust correlative rights in gas.
139. Administrative bodies otherwise charged with protecting
correlative rights.
140. Declared legislative policy to protect correlative rights.
52,

^QIT.glj'jyV-® lights, versus Conservation
The foregoing demonstrates the widespread blessings
that correlative rights have received from legislatures.
Correlative rights (including the right of capture) con-
cern a persons liberty to do with his property as he sees
fit so long as public policy in the form of rules of law
does not forbid it. Placed in the milieu of the totality
of conservation legislation, which forbids certain prac-
tices considered wasteful,, the cause of correlative rights
is fostered. This is the "Big Picture" which is an im-
personal thing G Anti-waste is an acceptable thing when
applied to a faceless person or one's greedy neighbor,, When
it comes to individual cases however, it is sometimes found
that one cannot have his conservation and eat it too. Then
this bundle of correlative rights is stripped of its wrapping
of altruism, and the person concerned clutches its basic
ingredient, i.e., his "right"' to obtain a just and equit-
able share. This is correlative rights versus anti-waste.
The outcome of this struggle was predictable, at least as
far back as Ohio Oil Company v n Indiana. There, conservation
stepped in to move the line of division between the oil
interests and the gas interests, at the expense of the for-
mer's theretofore right to capture a "just and equitable
are.
An exhaustive examination of how correlative rights




legislation is outside the scope of this paper. Some
cases will perhaps suffice to buttress the suspected gen-
erality, which has been aptly put by the Oklahoma court:
"In striking a balance between conservation of
natural resources and protection of correlative
rights „ the later is secondary and must yield to
142




So, where fixing of gas°oii ratio plus a flat allowable
resulted in penalizing 35% of the wells in the pool, the
143
conservation order was supreme. The court used the same
144
language in a later case but the result favored the
correlative rights of individuals over the best conservation
result. Here the struggle was between the applicant, wantinc
160 acre well spacing and those resisting, who wanted 80 acr«
well spacing. There was evidence that the 160 acre spacing
would provide 5% more ultimate recovery. In ruling in favor
of the 80 acre units, it was salds
""...by any spacing other than 80 acres the rights
of various owners within the area most probably
145
i be adversely affected, if not lost entirely. n
141. State regulation may be justified on the alternative
ground of preventing waste or to adjust correlative
rights. Republic Natural Gas Co. v. State of Oklahoma,
334 U.S. 62(1946).
142. Denver Producing and Refining Co. v. State, 199 Okla.
171, 184 P. 2d 961, 964 (1947). Cf Application of
Continental Oil Co., 198 Okla. 288, 178 P. 2d 880.
143. Denver Producing and Refining Co, v. State, supra.
144. Application of Champlin Refining Co., 296 P. 2d 176
COkla. 1956).




"We do not believe an "unnecessary" well should be
defined as a well an operator prefers not to drill
because of the possibility of eventual exhaustion
of a proven area by one, or a few wells, without
consideration or recognition of the rights of
146
others in the area."
Texas "Rule 37" cases deal directly with the tight-
rope walk between conservation and correlative rights.
While conservation is to be fostered, confiscation is to be
avoided. It is to be expected that both masters cannot al-
ways be served simultaneously.
Correlative rights have received a share of deference
by the Railroad Commissions
""...in the numerous cases involving exception to
Rule 37 brought before this court for review, the
Commission has almost uniformly granted permits where
deemed necessary to protect such property rights, re-
147
gardless of the question of waste. 9'
When the action of the Railroad Commission is considered
"unjust and unreasonable", or results in arbitrary discrimin-
ation between oil fields, or between different owners in the
same field, they will be considered confiscatory in nature
146. Og^^^ju^ra note 144, at 180.
147. Magnolia Petroleum v. Railroad Commission, 120 S.W. 2d
553, 554 (Tex Civ App. 1938). Here if exception to ruli
37 were denied, petitioner would suffer drainage disad-
vantage and the number of wells on his tract would not




and may not stand So when conservation order resulted
in drainage from the plaintiffs leases in a pool from which
a larger proportion of oil had previously been recovered and
where plaintiffs' leases had a much greater potential than
the surrounding area, relief was granted the plaintiffs as
they were considered to have been deprived of their property
149
rights. Likewise, so much of the Railroad Commission's
order, shutting down all wells in a certain oil field to
prevent waste by flaring of casinghead gas, as shut down
completely non-wasteful wells in order to protect correla-
tive rights of all (sic) owners of lands in the field until
facilities were available to market all gas therefrom, was
150
void.
On the other hand, correlative rights have suffered
in applications of the rule concerning the voluntary sub-
division of a tract after a spacing order has issued,, In
some cases, it appears that neither conservation nor corre-
lative rights have been the victor and the previous spacing
rule was supreme. So where plaintiff obtained one half of
a tract that had been voluntarily subdivided and defendant
later obtained a permit for the purpose of preventing confis-
cation (of the undivided tract),, the plaintiffs were en-
151
titled to no equitable relief to get a portion of the oil.
148. Mars v. Railroad Commission, 142 Tex 293, 177 S.W 2d
941 (1944).
149, .Id.
150, Railroad Commission v. Rowan Oil Co,, 152 Tex. 439, 259
S.W. 2d 173, (1953) Cf Thomson v. Consolidated Gas
Utilities Corp., 300 U.S. 55, (1937)
151. Ryan Consolidated Petroleum Corp. v. Pickens, 155 Tex
221, 285 S.W, 2d 201 (1955),
56,

It would seem that if a committment of the entire tract was
necessary before a permit were issued g equity would require
some property interest to redound to the owners of the prop-
152
erty without which the permit would not have been issued a
Another case which appears dedicated to the spacing
rule itself rather than correlative rights or conservation
153
is the Nqle v~ Carroll case. Here L owned ,51 acres for
which a drilling permit had been issued.. L transferred ,,17
acres to the defendant. This plot contained the spot where
the drilling was authorized,, A small portion had also been
transferred to P. D drilled on his plot and obtained a pro=
ducer. L and P were unable to get a permit as the tract had
been voluntarily subdivided after the spacing order 8 It was
held that L and P had no standing to enforce an equitable
division of royalties,,
So, damnum absque injuria lives on—only this time under
the aegis of the conservation age„ On behalf of this brand of
damnum, it is submitted that it should be objectively judged
as more equitable than the anarchy which it has replaced and
that it is reaching the de minimus stage.
152. See Griffith v. Gulf Refining Co., 215 Miss. 15, 60 So,
2d 518 (1952) and Hassie Hunt Trust v. Proctor,, 215
Miss. 84, 60 So. 2d 551 (1952).
153. 155 Tex. 555, 289 S.W. 2d 743 (1956), Cf. Humble Oil &





Future problems concerning correlative rights will,
of course, follow in the wake of scientific advancement
of the industry and the answers will be etched by the com-
bined stresses of economics and social outlook.
By a glance at the current writings on the industry,,
it is definitely and safely predictable that the problems
of tomorrow will be more complicated than those of today,,
There will still be conflict or landowner A versus landown-
er B regarding landowner B 9 s production practices on Black-
acre, However, it is to be expected that both A & B°s prob-
lems will be masked by the bigger picture and that their rights
will be recast by the mold of that picture Witness the
trend of correlative rights versus conservation,, Witness
also the oil import problem. This is a correlative right
problem on a grand scale where the "common reservoir" is the
world,
154
The headlines, "Is There More Oil at Titusville",
155
"Palynology—New Oil-Finding Tool", "Unitization by Mail
156
Saves Time, Tempers & Money" and "New Perforating Method
157
Developed" reveal the simple truth that the search for
and recovery of oil goes on in ever increasing tempo and
scale.
154. Oil & Gas J c , Aug 10, 1959, p 144 e
155 a Oil & Gas J , July 6, 1959, p. 165 c
156 a Oil & Gas J„, Aug, 10, 1959, p u 140 o
157. Oil & Gas J
, June 15, 1959, p c 68 Q "Western Co. last
week unveiled a revolutionary new erosion method of
perforating wells which it thinks may eventually put
conventional jet and bullet perforating in the same




Another headline, "World's Biggest Water Flood Nears",
gives one cause to muse. The operators of Wilmington field
in the Long Beach Harbor Area, under the over-all supervision
of the California State Division of Gas & Oil have planned
this flooding project for the dual purpose of recovering
400 million bbls. of oil and to check local land subsidence
The land has .already sunk 25 feet and is continuing to sink
at a rate of 1 foot per year. It is predicted that the set-
tling would reach a total 43 feet and downtown Long Beach
may settle 5 feet. Operational units are being formed along
fault lines. To prevent migration from one property to an-
other, lines of injection wells are to be drilled along com-
mon boundaries and a "wall of water" built up. It is plan-
ned to regulate the amount of water injection to keep mig-
ration from occuring. Also, the series of faults which div-
ide the areas are expected to provide seals against oil
migration as long as pressures are fairly uniform,, The in-
jection rate to stop subsidence and the injection rate to
obtain the best recovery are expected to be about the same.
Suppose the gears of planning get out of mesh in prac-
tice. Problems involving correlative rights virtually
bristle from such an hypothesis,, The correlative rights of
each operational unit, as well as the rights between units
will be at stake. Is everyone going to be happy with the
rate of injection of the water? Is everyone going to be
satisfied that he is getting his just and equitable share
158. Oil & Gas J OJ Aug 31 1959, p. 55 See McElroy,




and that he isn't being damaged by migration? Maybe the
unit agreements have provided for solution to most of the
parties thereto. But are there those (not parties to the
agreement) who desire the present rate of subsidence because
of some advantage to be gained by it? If so, what property
interest, if any, do they have in continued subsidence?
Another thought provoking headline iss ""Atomic Wastes
159
May Help Oil Men" s The sub headline is "Radioactive
waste may become future oil recovery tool."
The Texas Petroleum Research Committee, in cooperation
with the Atomic Energy Commission is working on a project
whereby use of radioactive wastes may be used as a means
of secondary recovery. For instance, an old gas reservoir
with pressure too low to be productive may be sealed off„
Radioactive, gamma emitting, liquid residue with a half=
life of say 30 years, would be injected into the reservoir,.
The gamma ray emissions would set up a boiling cycle wherein
the natural gas would be changed to usable hydrocarbons in
the liquid form over the period of the half=life of 30 years,
Then, it is hoped, the radioactivity would have decayed suff=
iciently to open the reservoir and recover the valuables,,
Initial laboratory tests of the effect of radiation
upon methane showed that about 24% of the methane was con-
verted into heavy, unsaturated hydrocarbons* While this
gives a measure of promise, the plan, of course, may never
come to pass But if it does, problems in the adjustment
of correlative rights will reach a new dimension,, All of
159. Oil & Gas J., July 13, 1959, p. 72,
60.

the problems attendent to the underground storage of natural
160
gas, plus a few more, will likely have to be resolved.
The undisputed and uninterrupted use of the reservoir for
the period of 30 years will have to be insured,,
May the reservoir be taken by one group by eminant do-
main, under the statutes provided for natural gas storage?
If not, there will be problems in long term leasing and pos-
sibly problems concerning accidental escape of dangerous
substances to the damage of overlying owners» Also, the
lessee will be keenly interested in seeing that the integ-
rity of the reservoir is not tampered with. If because
of these difficulties, the legislature and courts would make
eminent domain applicable, the taking of the landowners
just and equitable share and the placing an evaluation upon
that share is at issue* Would the long arm of the Federal
Power Commission reach to the bottom of the reservoir?
The foregoing examples are not intended to presume any
insight into the exact problems and answers of the future.
They may, however,, serve to illustrate vistas of thought
for the oil and gas lawyer who will be charged with welding
and resolving rights as basic as ownership, to practices as
new as creation of condensate by use of the gamma ray.
160. See Stamm, Legal Problems in the Underground Storage




The development of the law concerning correlative rights
was slow and laborious in the beginning. This is probably
explained by the early lack of knowledge of the nature of
the substances dealt with. Later with more knowledge to
work with, it was still difficult to fit oil and gas into
the scheme of surface property relationships already con-
structed. As a concomitant of this difficulty,, the economic
philosophy of the times was not geared to the unsuccessful
and empty-handed, equities to the contrary notwithstanding.
Consequently and perhaps inevitable, the convenient rule of
capture was allowed to gain full head Gross waste and in-
equity were its monuments. The courts were quicker to recog=
nize the undesireable results than they were to correct them<
This is probably because the difficulty of court resolu-
tion of the problems was increased in direct proportion to
an understanding of their existence,, It fell upon the legis=
latures to act— and they did e Ohio Oil Co„ y p Indiana,,
at once recognizing correlative rights and approving them as
a subject of state police power, opened the door to the age
of conservation in the industry,,
From then on, the doctrine of correlative rights has
been a dynamic force in the resolution of the conflicting
interests of entrepreneurs,, The ends of protection of cor-
relative rights and conservation are generally the same, but
occasionally they conflict, resulting in compromise of the
absolute protection of either
62.

Correlative rights are sometimes treated as a ginger-
bread appendage tacked on to a more fundamental structure of
the rule of capture. This I challenge' The rule of capture
has had its place in the basic structure of the totality of
the jural relationships involved here c There it remains,,
The mortar i^dry on the building block inscribed "rule of
capture" in the architecture of correlative rights To treat
the rule of capture otherwise is to do homage to an anach-
ronism. For a long time (and even sometimes now) it was
common to see language to this effect in a case report:
"The rule of capture has long been the law in this state,,
(cases cited) HOWEVER... 00 " (emphasis supplied). Then
the court would proceed to the real issue in the case. A
more realistic and expedient approach to the issues at hand
is often now found at the beginning of some Texas cases: "This
is a rule 37 case."
63,
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By this paper, it is intended to develop and record the
stages of growth of the "'regulation" of oil imports down to the
present mandatory^ import quota system,.
This is primarily a legal paper dealing with the legislative
basis for regulation and the raison d'etre of regulation, past
and present. There is no serious constitutional question in-
volved in the validity of the legislation upon which the present
a,
regulation is based. The regulations appear to be lawful and
as long as there is not any arbitrary administration of them,
the liklihood of mass challenge on the grounds of legality is
b.
ion of oil import regulations would be sterile
without a weaving in of the historic economic and political factors
which have shaped the course and scope of regulation. They should
therefore be referred to in any legal paper dealing with this
rather unique and recent experiment in government regulation.
a. See Eastern States Petroleum & Chem. Co., v. Seaton, 163 F.
797 CD. C. 1958).
Texas American Asphalt Corp. v. Walker, 177 F. Supp.
315 (So D e Texas 1959) and Eastern States Petroleum and
Chem. Co. v. Walker, 177 F. Sup 328 (S. D. Texas 1959).
It is too early to tell for certain how litigious those
who are effected will be. Gulf has recently attached the
method of quota fixing of residual imports, claiming that
the use of the year 1957 as a base is unfair and invalid.
It is reported that Gulf plans to appeal from a summary
judgment in the U.S. District Court denying relief. (Oil
& Gas J„, June 13, 1960, p. 66)
IV.

The writer is humbly aware that just because a lawyer uses
economic and political factors in describing the evolution of a
segment of regulation, he does not thereby gain the license to
become an economic or political soothsayer on the subjects,,
Dojbtless, freedom of expression allows us all a certain leeway
in making oracular pretenses as critics. The temptation is great
therefore, for the writer to step outside his competency and tread
foolishly into economics and politics. Competency in those fields
is more likely to be found in those who profess it. For those
whose interest is stimulated into the fields, attention, without
endorsement, is invited to;
1. De Chazeau & Kahn, Integration and Competition in
the Petroleum Industry (1959).
2. Raciti, Sebastian, The^Oij^ Import Problem. Studies
in Industrial Economics, No. 6., Fordham University
Press, New York, 1958.
3. Petroleum Industry Research Foundation, Inc., U^S^
OiJLJfaPiirtSo A Case Study in .International Trade.
Staff Project No. 10, New York, 1958.
4 Peterson, JJie^Ojiejjijjj)^^ Imported
Restrictions- American Enterprise Association,
Washington, D. C. (1959).
5. A Message from the Corporation Commission of the
State of Oklahoma about Domestic and Imported Oil,
Leader Press (undated but circa early 1960)





The problem of oil imports has many of the almost un=
solvable economic problems which are common to the imports of
any commodity. The voice of legitimate pressure addressed to the
governing ear must certainly leave some grave doubts as to the
proper course to follow for the benefit of all the governed. Yet,
the clamoring of interested groups almost dictates that some
governing action be taken, whether it be for the watchmaker in
Connecticut or the oil industry in Texas.
The dimensions of the considerations in the oil import problem
are, however, probably broader and deeper than with other commodities.




but it exercises a keen impact on global stategy and
3
world politics. Oil is big business and is among the 10 largest
4
industries. The year prior to the 1957 voluntary quota system cf
oil imports, oil imports were exceeded in dollar volume only by
5
coffee. Defense and diplomacy, both involved in the oil import
equation, do not always dictate the same course of action. While
1. For a history of the Federal Government's exercise of its powers
over oil in foreign commerce sees Ely, Conservation of, .Oil and
03^656=63 C1948) and Clark The Oil Century 229=54 (1958).
2. Ne ¥. Times, May 31, 1959, 111, p. 12M, col. 1=6.
3. JdU at 14M, colo 1-8.
4. Op. cit. supra note 2.
5. U.S. Imports^ Retarding, The,, Inevitable. Petroleum Press
Service, Sept. 1957, Vol. XXIV, No. 9, p. 322.

6
it is in the interest of diplomacy to foster free trade
friendly nations, it is just as urgent a requirement of defense
that oil, incapable of being stockpiled, be available in sufficient
7
quantity in the event these nations are no longer friendly.
Protection and fostering of foreign investment is also at stake,,
The goals of husbanding and restricting production of domestic
reserves and of providing incentive for exploration and development
of still further reserves (also to be properly conserved) perhaps
appear as contradictions of policy,, But policies and courses of
action in this field of imports are not clear cut They rather tend
to blend into the twilight of uncertainty and experiment. For
example, just eight days before the Presidential Proclamation
establishing a mandatory quota system for the imports of oil in
8
March 1959, the State Department Bulletin, in the recitation of
some excerpts from the economic report of the President, al
6. 60 Dep°t State Bull, 308 (1959).
7. Fanning, Foreign Oil and the Free World 266=80 C1954).
The statement of Oscar L B Chapman, Petroleum Administrator
for Defense, made at an address before the American Petrole=
um Institute in 1952 is quoted in part at page 276s 01> o . o at
present we do not begin to have the reserve we should have
in order to provide, not absolute security, but just the
minimum of security that would give us room for maneuver
in the opening months of a war B Our only consolation can
be that at the moment the Soviet and its satellites have
much less oil than we do, only about one-eleventh in fact.
But then that°s a balance that could all too easily be
disturbed almost overnight."




to U S C policy of eventually eliminating trade barriers.
Prior to the imposition of the mandatory quota system, the
federal government import policy was described as ""pusillanimous
1
"',,
as abdicating to the states the determination of national supply
arsd price, and as calling upon the large oil firms to play the
role of the statesmen that 'the elected representatives were not
10
assuming.
The sobering part of the import problem as it applies to oil
11
is that this commodity is so vital to our economy and to our
12
defense. While there have always been discoveries to
the reserves in pace with their use, there is certainly a limit
to the domestic supply. This presages that we shall become
6 Coincidentally, this same r<e
makes mention of the difficulty that U,S, coal was encouini-
tering in foreign markets. Coal interests, being willing
to recapture some of the domestic market which has been
lost to oil and natural gas, have a keen interest in oil
imports,
10, De Chateau & Kahn, Inteo^ atJj^n_ajid_Compet ition in .,the__Pg^
tj^lejim^jtodjistrv 253 (1959
)
This source advocates at
page 252s "".o,mandatory unitization for all producing
pools throughout this country under federal law,™
11, In 1958, petroleum was the source of more than 45% of
all U,S, energy used. Natural gas was the source of over
26%, N Y 9 Times, May 31, 1959, 111, p, M13, col, 1.
12, If, as was said by Lord Curzon, '"The Allies floated to
victory on a sea of oil " in WW I, they (the Allied Forces)
.gushed, to victory in WWII„ In WWII it is reported by Fan-
ning, op, cat,
„ supra note 7, at 267, that to operate the
Air Force 24 hours, fourteen times as much gasoline was





increasingly mote dependent on foreign oil in the future
and indicates that our policy toward foreign oil until such
time should proceed with caution to assure that the foreign oil
is there when needed. How soon we shall need it and how much w®
will need are just added uncerteinties in 'l|he already lengthy and
fuxzy equation.
Beg i nn i nq_ &t_ OoMP§Tn_0^aT_Oil_Import s Q
Mexico and Venezuela exported oil to the United States early
in the 20th century. It was in the 1930s, however, that some concern
14
over oil imports began to manifest itself. This was because of
15
domestic prices and proration. With the over abundance
13. JJie_Comjpu 1 s ory . CuXjjLJL°Aa^ IiMgig-o Petroleum Press Service,,
April 1959 Vol. XXVI, No. 4, p. 126 129s
MThe development
of indigenous shale oil production may help to postpone the
time when the United States becomes increasingly dependent
on imports. But that time will certainly come." Cf Knowles,
TJie_^rej^esj_ton^lexs 338 (1959) wherein one of the inter-
esting results of the Pratt and Weeks researches is recited
ass In the U.S., explorers have drilled one exploratory
well for each 9.4 square miles of favorable land, whereas
throughout the rest of the world one exploratory well has
been drilled for each 1,100 square miles of favorable land.
14. Clark, The Oil Century 229 (1958) and Hardwicke, Adequacy
of^Our Mineral Fuels, Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science, May 1952, p. 55, 62.
15. Rister, QijJ_Titan of the Southwest 315-26 (1949). See
also Glasscock, TJten_Came_0O 307=11 (1938)
4.

of production from the Oklahoma fields and the newly found East
Texas fields to add to the supply, the wasteful prodigality of
"find, produce quickly and sell at any price" begot hard fought
conservation measures, such as proration and well spacing. The
mere prevention of physical and economic waste through domestic
conversation measures was not satisfactory to producers when the
price could be held down by cheap imports,, Congressmen from oil
producing states objected, accusing the large integrated and foreign
operating oil companies of propagandizing for restriction of domestic
production in order to create a home market for cheaply produced and
16
sign oil. There was a clamor for high tariff or
legislative quotas on imports or both. As a resulting protective
measure, the Internal Revenue Act of 1932 levied a tax of % cent
per gallon on imported petroleum, 2J2 cents per gallon on gasoline or
17
motor fuels and 4 cents per gallon on lubricating oil. Mr, Ely
suggests that this was a compromise measure and some would have
imposed a $1 per barrel tax on crude, while others would have, by
18
quota, restricted imports to about J4 of the 1929 and 1930 leveli.
16. Clark, op. cit. supra note 14, at 231 reports that Congress;-
man Garber from Oklahoma produced figures showing that oil
could be delivered to the East Coast for 75 cents per barrel,
compared to $1.75 per barrel of Mid-Continent oil.
17. Int. Rev, Code of 1932, ch. 209, §601. As a measure with
the combined purposes of taxation and regulation of foreign
commerce, this statute was upheld in McGoldrick v. Gulf




At about this §ame time Governor Murray of Oklahoma formed the
no Oil States Advisory Committee 00 which was generally concerned
with the conservation of petroleum and the economic stresses of
the industry. This Committee was the predecessor of the Interstate
19
Compact. Some of the governor members of the Committee solicited
the aid of President Hoover to restrict imports. With Hoover's
influence (and perhaps with a threat of higher import restrictions
and taxes) the larger companies cooperated in a voluntary reduction
in the amount of 25%, using the year 1930 as a base. This probably
softened the Congressional impulse to enact strong import restrictions,
In 1933„ the Petroleum Code e which was established under the
20
National Industrial Recovery Act CNIRA) , authorized a quota on
oil imports which Mr. Ickes put into force on September 2 1933.
The calculation of the allowable imports was based upon the actual
imports during the last half of 1932 and amounted to 4.5% of the daily
21
domestic requirements. This mandatory quota went out with the
22
MSick Chicken 00 case but the large companies (again probably
i




A Legal History 545-55
(1948)
20. 48 Stat. 195 (1933).
21. Clark, The Oil Century 239 (1958)
22. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. U.S.„ 295 D.S. 495 C1935).
6.

mindful of the congressional temper to assist the oil producing
23
states in their economic difficulties) kept the imports at
24
"about the same percentages permitted under the Code. 09
As the *30s drew to a close, the age of conservation had
considerable momentum. Production control by administrative
25
aytiiicies was by then the accepted rule. The year 1939 saw a
difference in State and Federal objectives. Then, the Texas Railroad
Commission was much concerned over the low prices resulting from
over supply. Colonel Thompson, a dominant figure on the Commission,
26
wrote and published a letter to the Governor;
'"This cut £20 per cent,/ is wholly unwarranted... I am
advocating to my collegues on the Railroad Commission
that we shut down all Texas oil fields for thirty days."
This was the same year that the Federal government by a Reciprocal
Trade Agreement, halved the excise tax on oil imports from Venezuela,
providing- Venezuelan exports to the U.S. did not exceed 5% of the
27
previous year's U.S. crude run.
WWII a nd Naval Petroleum Reserves.
World War II left the question of imports versus domestic
production in a state of suspension. But, while World War II
23. One manifestation of this Congressional temper was the
passage of the Connally 00Hot Oil 90 Act in 1935 which so>
„
to assist the states in their attempts to control the amount
of production, (49 Stat. 30, 15 U.S.C.A. 715 (1935)).




& CajJL_A_j:^gjdJjisjtory. 657 (1948).
25. Davis and Willbern, Adjyjyj|trj*tJ^
uction in Texas, 22 Texas L. Rev. 149 (1943).
26. JdU at 155.
27 » E ly aB-MijUUIBia note 24, at 658.

was a balm to the problem of domestic over-production,, it was
a catalyst to the problem of imports. The oil industry rose
to the task demanded of it, but the drain on our resources was
tremendouSo For instance, from Pearl Harbor (7 December 1941)
to 30 June 1946, the Defense Supplies Corporation purchased
28
almost 132 billion gallons of 100 octane aviation gasoline,,
The Naval Petroleum Reserves had been created, commencing
in 1912, with a view toward preservation in the ground of oil
for the Navy's use in emergencies and military purposes. Although
these reserves served their intended purpose during WWII, the
occasion required more^—a total mobilization of the industry,,
The 0°Mahon©y Committee, after making a 1945 survey of petroleum
supply in 1945, reported that "the total estimated recoverable oil
from the three Naval Petroleum Reserves, other than Alaska, is
only 376,000,000 barrels. It is obvious that the amount of oil
producible from these modest reserves would constitute but slight
29
assistance in the event of war..."
Albeit inadequate to meet the demands of total war, the idea
of the Naval Petroleum Reserves (now including Oil Shale Reserves)
28. Clark, oPo^qiIU.,supra, note 21, at 241 Clark also
that the Ue S. had produced 63 a 2% of all oil produced in thu
world up through 1950, having then only 26% of the world's
reserves
o
29. Ely, ogj^jy to _supra note 24, at 622» Pressure for discon-
tinuance of the Naval Petroleum Reserves has been unrelent-
ing and sometimes successful. See, for an interesting his<
toric account, Werner, Tejtpot_Dome (1959). The quoted
statement has since proven to be in gross error. There is
now an estimated reserve of over 1 billion barrels in the
Navy's Elk Hills, California field alone.
8.

is, from the standpoint of national security, hardly assailable.
On the contrary, it has become contagious,. It is now realised
from the lessons of WWII that our total reser¥es, indeed the reserves
of the Western Hemisphere, must be counted as critical for future
security planning. In this milieu the Navy's policy has served
as precedent for later government, planning and action. In a recent
30
pamphlet, such policy was declared t
f9 § policy as to the future administration of the
Naval Petroleum Reserves will be, as it has been in the
past, that there shall be the maximum conservation of the
oil consistent with the needs of the national security.
The Navy has regarded itself as charged by Congress with
the responsibility for maintaining its present holdings
of oil as a reserve in the ground, insofar as that can
possibly be achieved, and for restricting production to
minimum necessary to maintain the field in a state of
It is abundantly clear, from the Navy's experience, that
frugality is the best way to improve ones relative position ii
31
the possession of oil reserves i
30. This pamphlet, titled "History of Naval Petroleum and Oi
Shale Reserves 00
,
and prepared by the Office of Naval Pe°
troleum and Oil Shale Reserves, is undated but contains
factual data through 1 January 1959. The quotation is
31. Jd. at 15.
9.

"The oil reserves in the Naval Petroleum Reserve No. 1
are now in excess of 25% of those on the West Coast,
and this Petroleum Reserve may expect to grow in stature as
the domestic reserves of oil, not only on the West Coast,
but also throughout the United States, dwindle."
The Navy's stewardship, following congressional mandate, is not
motivated by profit making policies. This is to be contrasted with
private industry, which must profit in order to survive.
What Price, Pol icy?
Thus, the U.S. oil industry was neither born nor nurtured
in frugality. Reserves have been found for exploitation and
not for preservation. Thus, by sharp contrast of the double edged
desires of government to at once preserve our domestic oil and
keep a healthy oil economy, with the absolutely essential desire
of the industry to produce, whether located domestically or in
foreign fields, the question of oil imports assumes riddle-like
dimensions.
It is simple truth that the more imported oil we use domes-
tically, the less we will be forced to use from our domestic
reservoirs and the less oil will be available for enemy use
against us in the event of war. It follows that this action would
leave us more domestic oil for use in any future defense of our
country. It is also good planning not to depend upon oil from
foreign sources in the event of another total war. This indicates
10.

that our domestic reserves should be in a healthy state of
readiness. To accomplish this, aliunde total government control
or subsidization, the industry must make profits. Profits are
only through extraction of the reserves in quantity. So,
one conclude that by using our reserves we are conserving
them? By its ludicrous sound, this statement emphasizes that
there are premises in the picture from the present policy
standpoint other than use or non-use of domestic supply.
It has been suggested that petroleum prices wield the big
32
stick in policy formation. The history of the present legis-
lative basis for mandatory import quotas, to be discussed later,
gives testimony of the wedding of national security to the economic
of the country. This, in turn, is related to the hea
33
the industry concerned. When production is regulated by the
as it is, and geared to market demand, as it is, some
results are apparent. Included among them are that oil producing
states are going to follow their self-interest to maintain attrac-
tive price levels. Texas has a big share in this, producing 1 out
of 7 barrels of all oil produced in the world, and 2 out of 5
34
barrels produced in the U.S. For this husbandry, the industry
in Texas absorbs the market effects of those states which do not so
32. De Chazeau & Kahn, Integration and Competition in the
Petroleum Industry 218 (1959).
33. See U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, 85 Cong. 2d Sess., 1958,
Vol. 2, p. 3609 et^^jgg,.




ulate— - at a cost to Texas operators.
That a policy which at once endeavors to satisfy protective
pricing and national defense would receive criticism, is
inevitable. A sharp one ist
"There is a critical need for a coordinated, consistent
policy toward this vital industry. No such policy now
exists i what we have instead is a patchwork of inter-
ferences, concocted and administered piecemeal, prag-
matically, under a variety of influences, by a variety of
governmental agencies, directed to a variety of goals—
36
none of them ever fully reconciled."
It does appear clear that from a long term standpoint, goals of
a healthy domestic industry and conservation of domestic supply
for a future use, cannot both be served by restriction of imports.
The divergence of opinion within the industry itself reveals!
that we have yet to find some agreement as to the amount of
allowable imports. The majors and the independents agree upon the
desirability of the nation having a continued and reasonable oil
supply. They also agree that it is desirable to keep a sound
domestic industry. Furthermore, they agree that some imports
are needed. From that point on, opinions differ. The independents
stress that their production and their profits must be §uch as will
35. De Chateau & Kahn, op. cit. supra note 32, at 228 See
also, Oil & Gas J., What 8 Davs Will Mean To_Tgxang, 31
March 1958, p. 47.
36. Jd. at 244.
12.

allow them to have incentive for further search. They would have
us drain all we can from our domestic reserves, even though the
operation of marginal wells will mean some additional cost to the
consumer. On the other hand, the majors point out that domestic
oil is becoming increasingly more difficult and expensive to find
and that national security in the long run, depends just as much
upon development of foreign petroleum sources in order to make our
domestic reserves last longer as it does upon a sound and secure
domestic industry. The majors also argue that they are not out
to wreck the independents for the very good reason that they desire
to profit from their own domestic affiliates.
Merit can be found in the arguments of both sides. The
answer which is yet to come, on just how much is the right amount
of imports, lies somewhere in the areas above outlined. As will be
seen later, the Federal government has arrived at an '"iii^betwais 01 -area
on policy regarding the amount of imports. This has resulted from an
attempted compromise and resolution of the interests involved,, Such
is not uncommon in the formulation of Congressional and Executive
policy. It may well be that the problem, by its nature, will not
be a long-term one. With population and the demand for petroleum
products on the rise, in a few years, we may welcome all of the oil
imports that we are able to obtain. Moreover, if we are really
serious about conservation of our domestic supply (and this has
37
been questioned ) some consideration could be given to belt
37. De Chazeau & Kahn, pp. cit. supra note 34, at 230 et. seq.
13.

tightening measures which would be calculated to require everyone
to share the expense of conservation. When, as by restriction
of imports, prices are maintained or increased, the consumer
is forced to bear the cost of protection, rather than share in
38
the cost of conservation.
MID-CENTURY OUTLOOK
Renewed Concern Over Oil Imports .
In 1944 the Federal government took stock of the drain on the
domestic oil reserves resulting from WWII and sought to participate
in the hastening of the development of the reserves in the Middle
East. American companies holding interests abroad refused to sell
stock to the U.S. and resisted attempts of the Federal government to
39
get into the pileline construction business. There were, however
valid reasons for the United States to seek, by whatever meaiiares
"most economic and least disturbing, an increase in the American
38. We have paid $15.7 billion (from 1953 to 1958) for farm
subsidies, many of the products of which are slurp Huns to
our needs. (Life, Vol. 47, No. 23, Dec. 7, 1959, p. 138 *<„
If we can afford this, perhaps we can afford a subsidy for
non-production by the oil producer. This, in contrast to
the farm subsidy, would allow us to keep the valuable pro-
duce for future needs and allow us to trade our dollars for
foreign irreplaceable resources in the meantime.
Knowledge can certainly be imputed to all of those
interested, including the Federal Government, of factors
such as encouragement of foreign investment and increase
in domestic refining capacity, which were likely to lead
to domestic oversupply in peacetime. This, in turn, was
likely to lead to some demand for protection of the
industry. See De Chazeau & Kahn, op. cit. supra note
34, at 218, 210, and 484.
39. Ely, op. cit. supra note 24, at 659.

40
controlled oil properties in the Middle East/' These
41
reasons were bluntly summarized by Mr. Feis:
"The first reason is found in the prospect that before
long increased production from those properties /Middle
East/ will be needed to meet the world demand. The
second is that those properties should be drawn upon more
amply than in the past in order to reduce the prospective
drain on the reserves of this hemispheres for these
reserves would be essential to the security of the United
States in the event of a future crisis.'9
International agreement for orderly development of and equal
opportunity for world petroleum was considered, proceeded to the
point of having tentative endorsement by the U.S. industry, and
was reported upon favorably by the Senate Committee on Foreign
42
Relations in 1947. Industrial support of the proposed treaty
43
waned, probably because of fears of federal controls over the
domestic industry. The treaty was therefore never ratified.
40. Herbert Feis, Order in Oil. 22 Foreign Affairs 616, 626
(1944).
41. Ibid.
42. Ely, op. cit. supra note 24, at 661.
43. In January 1946, the Independent Petroleum Association of
America was still endorsing the treaty. Oil & Gas J., 26
January, 1946, p. 151. However with the resignation of
Ickes (Oil & Gas J., 23 February, 1946, p. 108) and the
lifting of price controls (Oil & Gas J., 3 August 1946,
p. 56) the industry enjoyed flexing its newly freed
muscles of independence. By September °f 9 1946, a headline
in the Oil & Gas J. at page 52 was °°0jJ_Men Fee 1„ Time, Not




By 1947, foreign petroleum operations were 20% owned by
44
U.S. concerns and in the same year the export- import balance
had shifted, making the U.S. a net importer., This was occasioned
by the unprecedented demand for petroleum products in peacetime.
One Senator proposed an immediate embargo on oil exports and a
Congressman declared
s
"...the progressively increasing demand for petroleum in
the United States and Europe, and the reliance which hith-
erto has been placed on greatly expanded petroleum prod-
uction in the Middle East in supplying this growing d©=
mand in both continents, makes imperative a complete
review of the degree of confidence which we justifiably
may have in imports and foreign reserves, under changing
45
political conditions. 00
So while there was both official and industrial coneerK over
imports at the mid-century, there was by no means a unanimity of
method of approach. Official thinking was 00obsessed 0(> by alarm at
46
the prospect of imminent shortage, while the industry was
concerned with meeting increased demand for oil and for protection.
So with some wanting controls on exports, others wanting more
stringent import controls, and as many as nine federal agencies
48
working on National Oil Policy at one time, it is understandable
44. Oil & Gas J„, December 20, 1947, p„ 42.
45. Oil & Gas J., January 29, 1943, p c 138.
46. World Oil, July 1949, p. 29.
47. .Ibid.




that the report of the National Petroleum Council,, an advisory body
to the Secretary of the Interior would attempt to gather all
under its umbrella of announced policy:
"The nation's economic welfare and security requires a
policy on petroleum imports which will encourage explor-
ation and development efforts in the domestic industry
and which will make available a maximum supply of domestic
oil to meet the needs of the nation.
'"The availability of petroleum from domestic fields
produced under sound conservation practices, together with
other pertinent factors, provides the means for determin-
ing if imports are desireable to supplement our oil sup-
plies on a basis which will be sound in terms of the inat~
ional economy and in terms of conservation
"The implementation of an import policy,, therefore,
should be flexible so that adjustments may readily be
made from time to time*
"Imports in excess of our economic needs after talcing
into account domestic production in conformance with good
conservation practices and within the limits of maximum
efficient rates of production, will retard domestic
exploration and development of new oil fields and t he-
technological progress in all branches of the industry





The headline, "'Washington Hopes for Agreement on U.S.
50
Oil Imports 00 is a most eloquent summation of the foregoing
quotation. The more responsible segment of the oil industry
desired that the large importers exercise temperance, having
in mind the alternative——the establishment of a quota system and
the embryo of government control. The larger importers exercised
restraint in 1950 and cut down their scheduled shipments for the
51
year by a total of 70,000 barrels daily.
Crisis Again Postpones—Then Rushes Action.
Any further attempts to juxtapose the desires to keep our oil
and use it too into a workable long term policy was temporarily
suspended by the Korean conflict—and later influenced by the Suez
crisis. Both events tendered obvious lessons of history for those
willing to accept. Korea and Suez both demonstrated U.S. political
maturity and global responsibility. Both demonstrated that our
oil is available for use at present when called upon. Suez was
later to demonstrate that foreign oil supply to the U.S. and
friendly Europe is, at best, at the mercy of the changing complexion
of cold war.
49. Clark, The Oil Century 246 (1958).
50. World Oil, March 1950, p. 41: "Congressional subcommittees
will continue to study the subject, but if the oil industry
can meet the situation by voluntary action, it will be a





In January 1951, President Truman formed the Materials Policy
Commission. About 18 months later the report of the Commission's
study, described as "one of the most exhaustive studies ever made
52
of the problem of strategic materials for defense** was released.
The report was *no prophecy of doom, but was a frank prediction of
progressive inadequacy of petroleum to satisfy future domestic
energy requirements. The 1975 demand for petroleum is expected to
be more than double the 1950 demand in the U.S. In other parts of the
free world, the demand is expected to be three and four times as
53
great as in 1950.
54
The tonic of new discoveries after Korea allowed the
continuation of the study of the problem of oil imports in an
atmosphere of deliberativeness rather than panic. So it was when
President Eisenhower in July 1954 appointed the Committee on
Energy Supplies and Resources to broadly examine all factors
pertaining to U.S. energy and resources "with the aim of
strengthening the national defense, providing orderly industrial
growth, and assuring supplies for our expanding national economy
52. Fanning, Foreign Oil and The Free World 274 (1954).
53. See the President s Materials Policy Report, ""Resources
for Freedom ', Vol. Ill, June 1952.
54. Fanning, op. cit.
n
supra note 52, at 277. In May, 1953,
twenty new fields in Texas were discovered, bringing the
year's total to 266 in the State. This was an increase of




and for any future emergency." With no immediate emergency
in sight, it is, not surprising that one of the uppermost
and most insistent cries that occupied the Committee" s mind
was that penetrating rhetorical outburst made by E. 0. Thompson,
Railroad Commissioner of Texas, when said, in hearings before
the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce: "How
can a Texas twenty barrel allowable complete with a five
56
thousand barrel well!" In addition, the demands of the coal
interests for import restrictions, the concern of Venezuela and
Canada, and the desire to build up Western Hemisphere petroleum
supply facilities and vital reserves, thickened the porridge.
It is no wonder that Mr. Fanning declared, "There is no easy
answer to the import problem—no more so than there is to the
55. Ibid.




entire question of foreign oil and the Free World."
LEGISLATIVE BASIS FOR MODERN REGULATION
Immediate Preludes to 1955 Legislation.
Soon after Congress met in 1955, on 26 February, the White
House released the report on energy supplies and resources policy.
58
The Committee had concluded that in the interests of national
security, imports of crude and residual oils should be kept in
57. Fanning, op. cit. supra note 52, at 278. One might wonder,
in the consideration of this entire question, why more
emphasis is not placed on exports. An embargo on exports
(see text at note 45) as well as restriction upon imports
would aid in the desired end of husbanding our reserves for
domestic use. It is to be expected that restrictions upon
imports will reflect upon exports in that the less we import
the easier it will be for domestic producers to find profit-
able domestic markets. The record since 1958 bears this out,
showing a decline in exports. In 1958 we exported 276,000 b/d,
The estimate for 1960 is 230,000 b/d. (Oil & Gas J., Jan. 25,
1960, p. 173). Most of this 1960 amount, 224,000 b/d, is
expected to be in products rather than crude. In addition,
examination of the legislative basis for modern regulation,
infra, p. 23 shows unmistakeably that the dominant forces
in policy formation are primarily concerned with protection
of a healthy industry. This means encouragement of discov-
ery and production from domestic reserves. Disposition of
the product, so encouraged, has been of secondary importance.
Since national security depends upon possession and use of
these same reserves, it is difficult to reconcile how a
healthy industry will preserve national security (see Sen.
Douglas' views on this problem in general, infra , p. 29).
The reconciliation involves a gamble on timing and total avail=
ability of reserves for the free world. If we seriously
deplete our reserves in order to keep the industry healthy
until WX" day when domestic demand will overtake supply,
then we may win the battle of a healthy industry, to the
detriment of our national security. In the meantime, it
appears that exports will, to the extent they contribute
to a "healthy industry", be involved in the same gamble.
58. This is the Cabinet Committee that President Eisenhower
appointed the previous July. See text at page 19.
21.

balance with the domestic production of crude oil at the
59
proportionate relationships that existed in 1954. This
was around 10% imports—--90% domestic.
As a result of this Committee's study, the importing
companies were requested to restrict imports of petroleum to
the United States on a voluntary, individual basis in conformity
60
with the policies enunciated by the Committee. The over-
riding concern of the Committee was "inadequate incentive for
exploration and the discovery of new sources of supply" which
it believed, would be detrimental to the future demands of civilian
61
use and national defense.
59. For text of this portion of the Energy and Resources Rep-
ort, see Oil & Gas J., March 7, 1955, p. 85. This being
^ a cabinet committee, agreement was reached as to the
broad policy on imports without any statement of oppo-
sition. This is not to say that the way was clear to all
or that there was general agreement. The hearings on the
Trade Agreements Extension Act developed the traditional
"foreign policy versus domestic producers" conflict of
opinions. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
CGATT) also came under sharp criticism.
60. In editorial comment on the report, World Oil, April 1955,
p. 29 declared: "The chief value of the reports lies in
bringing out clearly the issue between those who believe
that the national welfare is best served by preserving
freedom of initiative to the individual and holding
necessary controls so far as possible to local levels and
those who favor the continuous extension of government
control and management over industry."
61. Oil & Gas J., March 7, 1955, p. 85. Just the week before,
in the Oil and Gas J., February 28, 1955, pp. 82-83, the




The immediate preludes to the passage of the 1955
amendment to the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (Trade Agreements
62
Extension Act) were: (1) Senator Neely of West Virginia
63
demanded an arbitrary limitation of imports to 10% of demand
,
(2) Standard Oil of New Jersey indicated that it would hold its
imports down, based on a 1954 ratio, and Gulf agreed to go along
64
"so long as other importers do likewise" , (3) the I. P. A. A.
65
backed the Neely amendment t (4) the State Department opposed the
Neely amendment as the Department "saw no evidence that either
/coal or oil/ has... suffered from imports... as to justify the





, (5) more all-time highs in imports were noted , with
68
another trim in the Texas allowable
,
and (6) Congress, exercising
political wisdom, indicated a penchant to frame legislation in
such a fashion as to put the responsibility upon the Executive
69
branch to determine when and how much to restrict oil imports.
The amendment that was to become applied in the restriction
70
of petroleum imports was:
62. Trade Agreements Extension Act, ch. 169 §7, 69 Stat. 166
(1955).
63. Oil & Gas J., March 21, 1955, p. 122.
64. Jd. at 123.
65. Oil & Gas J., April 4, 1955, p. 106.
66. Oil & Gas J., April 18, 1955, p. 111.
67. Oil & Gas J., April 25, 1955, p. 82.
68. J<i. at 98.
69. Oil & Gas J., May 2, 1955.




"(b) In order to further the policy and purpose of this
section, whenever the Director of the Office of Defense
Mobilization has reason to believe that any article is
being imported into the United States in such quantities
as to threaten to impair the national security, he shall
so advise the President, and if the President agrees that
there is reason for such belief, the President shall
cause an immediate investigation to be made to determine
the facts. If, on the basis of such investigation, and the
report to him of the findings and recommendations made in
connection therewith, the President finds that the article
is being imported into the United States in such quantities
as to threaten to impair the national security, he shall
take such action as he deems necessary to adjust the
imports of such article to a level that will not threaten
to impair the national security."
It should be noted that the words of the statute avoid the issue
of how much imports will threaten to impair the national security.
Impairment of national security is clearly the evil legislated
against, but it was still unclear as to exactly what gave rise
to the evil.
For those interested in strong protection, the evil was




interest, economy, security, and independence." And, in spite
72
of the language of the bill quoted above, it was hotly declared:
"There is not one word guaranteeing any American inarket
or supplier against suffocation by foreign imports. There
is not pne word in this bill that offers real safeguards
from cutrate foreign competition to any American
employed in a domestic industry or whose dollars are
invested in America...."
This 1955 amendment was never called in to use to require any
restriction upon imports. How much of a deterrent, if any, it was
to those who would break away from the "voluntary" import quota
system, is a matter for speculation. Administration of the
import program, during this phase of "regulation" will be treated
in more detail later.
1958 Modifications,
The Trade Agreement Extension Act of 1958 contains present
71. Statement of Senator George W. Malone of Nevada, U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1955, Vol. 2, p.
2111. In spite of statements like this which tend to place
all or most of the ills on the oil industry upon imports,
one should not be unmindful that the flattening of demand
for petroleum is the real problem in the U.S. industry.
If imports were entirely shut off, there would still be
too much oil. World Petroleum, June, i960, Vol. 31, No. 6,
p. 5.




legislative authority for regulation of imports. Existing
law is strengthened by a requirement that no action shall be
taken to decrease the duty on an article if the President finds
74
such reduction would threaten to impair the national security.
Under the 1955 amendment, the onus was upon the President
to cause an investigation if he were advised that some article was
being imported into the United States in such quantities as to
threaten to impair the national security. Now, the Director of the
Office of Defense Mobilization (name has been changed to "Office
of Civil and Defense Mobilization" and for purposes of brevity will
hereafter be referred to as "Director") does the investigation
upon his own motion or upon request of some other governmental
agency. If then, he believes that the national security is being
impaired, he is enjoined to so advise the President. At that point,
the President is required to take the needed action unless he finds
that the imports of the article are not in such quantities which would
threaten national security. The act does not say whether the
President would cause another investigation. Presumably he could
reject the advice of the Director without an investigation=~=>but
this, being an impolitic move, is not likely to occur.
73. 72 Stat. 673 (1958), 19 U.S.C.A. 1352 a (a), (b), (c), (d)
and (e). This modification was brought about at the insis-
tence by some that imports were still too high. See Oil &
Gas Journals, May 12, 1958, p. 81; May 19, 1958, p. 99 and
May 26, 1958, p. 59.
74. 72 Stat. 673 (1958), 19 U.S.C.A. 1352 a (a).
26.

The addition of subsection (c) gives some criteria for
the Director and the President to go by, "without excluding
75
other relevant factors.** They are enjoined to give consid-
eration to:
(1) domestic production needed for projected national
defense requirements
(2) existing and anticipated availabilities of resources
essential to the national defense
(3) growth requirements and stimulation necessary to ass-
ure such growth
(4) how imports will affect the foregoing.
The Director and the President are also required to recognize the
close relation between economic welfare of the nation and national
security and to consider foreign competition versus: (1) economic
welfare of individual domestic industries, (2) substantial domestic
unemployment, (3) decrease in government revenues, (4) loss of
76
skills or investment, or (5) "other serious effects."
From the foregoing, a burden of highly skilled, if not impossible,
omniscience has been placed upon the Director and President. The
75. 72 Stat. 673 (1958), 19 U.S.C.A. 1352a (c).
76
« JMd* The remaining added subsections relate to publication
of reports and reports to Congress.
27.

record clearly shows that Congress, the fact finder and policy
maker has not been able to synthesize all of the ingredients of
the problem into a workable formula. A part of Senate Report
77
1838 of July 15, 1958 tacitly admits as much:
HA great deal has been said about the large numbers of
workers dependent on foreign trade but the committee was
unable to uncover any information as to the overall dis-
placement of workers as a result of imports.. .. In the
meantime, there is convincing evidence that in certain
areas, in segments of vulnerable industries, and across
the nation as a whole, excessive imports have caused
unemployment and other wise weakened the economy which
is in itself a vital part of our national security....**
Since this burden involves the task of continual resolution
of relative values, it is to be expected that the debate from
interested sources will require frequent re-evaluation of any
action taken. So if a decision is about to be reached to res-
trict imports to a certain percentage figure which will permit
more imports than before, it follows that those adversely effected
will make their position known. While this will undoubtedly
cause some illumination upon the path of policy, one might
wonder whether "national security" will become highly colored




by definition from the loudest and most insistent groups seeking
a particular brand of economic welfare.
In this respect, the individual views of Senator Douglas,
in opposition to this so called "National Security Amendment'*,
78
are of interest. He foresaw the national security amendment
as subject to abuse in order for special tariff treatment.
He saw in the amendment an "implicit syllogism", which is:
(1) The economic welfare of the country affects national
security.
(2) Any industry which is injured by imports weakens the
economic welfare of the country.
(3) Therefore, injury to a domestic firm or product, or
unemployment, or a decrease in Government revenues,
loss of skills or investment, affects the national
security.
Senator Douglas listed some industries which have sought escape-
clause relief in the past (special tariff protection), and which
he believed could now seek relief as national security industries.
79
He listed about 50 items
,
among them: spring clothespins, glace
cherries, pregnant mares urine, rosaries, red fescue seed,
hatter's fur, ferrocerium (lighter flints), watches, and bicycles.
78. Id. at 3630.
79. Op. cit. supra note 77, at 3631.
29.

In short, he was opposed to expansion of protection. Protection,
however, in precious to those who have it, and who want more of
80
it.
VOLUNTARY PHASE OF REGULATION
Districts, for Administration.
In order to deal with the events leading to the establish-
ment of the voluntary phase of regulation, "Coordination Dis-
tricts" have been set up. These Districts are now divided,
for the purposes of administration, into two categories. These
are Districts I-IV and District V. The former Districts (com-
posed of all the States with the exceptions of the West Coast
States, Nevada, Arizona, Alaska and Hawaii) have a substantial
production capacity which is in excess of actual production.
This is largely because of the control of State regulatory
80. The Dallas Morning News, Dec. 5, 1959, §1, p. 8, col. 4
reported that Senator Yarborough of Texas declared: "Cong-
ress should act to protect our valuable domestic petroleum
industry, its employees and our federal, state and local
government
s
00 .. We need a stronger basis for the control of
oil imports than this /referring to the mandatory quota
system/."
Incidentially, the Joint Committee for American-Flag
Tankers and the Committee of American Tanker Owners, Inc.,
now want protection from the Office of Civil and Defense
Mobilization. Their desire is for a regulation requiring
that 50% of all oil imports be carried in U.S. -flag tankers.
The tankers interests' argument is that without such protect-
ion they could not compete with foreign tankers and that
such a result adversely affects national security. Oil &




commissions. On the other hand, District V, which is composed
largely by California oil fields, does not have production
control as in Districts I- IV. Production is declining steadily
and imports are necessary to meet demands. Furthermore, the
separation of these two categories is such that transportation from
Districts I-IV to District V is difficult. This situation was improved
in 1958 by additional pipeline capacity from Texas and Oklahoma to
the West Coast.
Events Leading to Voluntary Quota System.
The policy of voluntary restriction worked reasonably well until
82
about the middle of 1956. This voluntary restriction was the type
wherein the importing companies were requested to keep their crude
imports within the 1954 production ratio. This ratio was slightly In
83
excess of 10%. The Special Committee to Investigate Crude Oil
Imports (a blue ribbon committee composed of the Secretaries of
the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, Interior, Labor, and
Commerce) found, however, on the basis of schedules submitted to
the Office of Defense Mobilization that there was scheduled a sharp
rise in imports for the last half of 1956 and 1957. The following
table, taken from the Report of Special Committee to Investigate Crude
Oil Imports, 29 July 1957, reveals the imports by categorized Districts
and the progression of the percentage ratios of imports to production:
81. Report of Special Committee to Investigate Crude Oil Imports,
29 July 1957 (no pagination). For a map of the Districts, See
Appendix I.
82. Ibid .
83. The ratio for all imported petroleum products was in excess of 16%.
31.
















(In Thousands of Barrels Daily)
1st half 3rd quarter 4th quarter 2d half
1956 1956 1956 19571955
689 735 830 718 971
5835 6199 6155 6212 6079
11.8 11.9 13.5 11.6 16.0
93 153 212 198
(
275
972 967 959 949 923
9.6 15.8 22.1 20.9 29.8
782 888 1042 916 1246
6807 7166 7114 7161 7002





(1) The importing companies in filing reports with the Office of
Defense Mobilization estimated that their imports into Dis-
trict V for this period would be 296,000 barrels per day.
There is reason to believe, however, that these imports will
not exceed 275,000 barrels per day and, as a result, this
figure is being used throughout the report.
(2) Estimated, Office of Oil and Gas, Department of the Interior.
32.

It will be seen from the foregoing table that imports
increased only slightly in Districts I-IV in 1955 and the first
half of 1956. This brought the ratio up to 11.9%. There was a
sharp rise in the third quarter of 1956 to 13.5%. The drop in the
84
fourth quarter may be attributed to Suez. After Suez opened, the
schedules filed rose, as may be seen, to 16%.
The rise of imports and planned imports in District V was even
more pronounced, going from 5.2% to a projected 29.8% for the second
half of 1957.
The Under Secretary of State, Herbert Hoover, Jr., was, in June
1956, reflecting the country's diplomatic viewpoint in declaring
that discriminatory measures, quotas, and governmental regulation,
85
'
were not favored by the administration. Quotas were described as
placing "shackles on an industry whose dynamic qualities should be
fostered rather than hampered." He also warned that quotas would
86
ultimately lead to governmental price fixing and further controls,
Mr. Hoover received a hot rejoinder, reflectina clearly that all were
87
not so frightened of Government control. The Independent Petroleum
84* Op. cit. supra note 81.
85. Clark, The Oil Century 247 (1958). Clark's source is from a
speech delivered at the 1956 mid-year meeting of the Interstate
Oil Compact Commission, held in Dallas, Texas.
86. Ibid .
87. Id. at 248. Mr. Warwick M. Downing, Colorado's representative
at the meeting declared, inter alia, "Free enterprise has never
meant that business should be free of Governmental control...."
33.

Association of America (IPAA) indeed asked for control. On
August 7th, they asked that action be taken under the portion of
88
the 1955 Trade Agreements Extension Act quoted above.
After receiving the request of the IPAA, the Director of
Defense Mobilization caused a public hearing to be held from
89
October 22-24,' 1956. As the hearings were held, imports were
90
slowing gains. No action was taken immediately, but the Director
declared that, but for the Suez crisis, he would have no course
but to make a certification under the Trade Agreements Extension
Act of 1955 that projected import plans constituted a threat to
national security.
Considerations of the Special Committee to Investigate Crude
Oil Imports. The facts of rising imports are recorded in the
above table. The Committee considered that there was a direct
relationship between the nation's security and available sources
of energy. Not seeing any immediate replacement for oil and gas,
91
which accounts for 2/3 of consumed energy in the U.S.
,
available
supplies were considered important.
The crux of the Committee's rationale was that a limitation of
92
imports will tend to insure a "proper balance" between imports
and domestic production.
88. See text at note 70.
89. Op. cit. supra note 81.
90. Oil & Gas J., October 29, 1956, p. 77.
91. Op. cit. supra note 11.
92. Op. cit. supra note 81.
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The Committee rejected a plan of importing foreign crude
into the U.S. and storing it within completed fields or elsewhere,
as being too costly and as presenting too many physical problems.
Also rejected was a course of action that would enlarge govern-
ment participation in exploring for oil reserves which would be
shut in as reserves. This, too, was considered too costly and
"contrary to the principles of free enterprise which characterize
93
American industry."
Outright encouragement of increased imports in order to
conserve domestic reserves was rejected as unsound. It was
believed that this:
(1) Would result in a flow of foreign oil which was in
excess of the quantities needed to supplement domes-
tic supply.
(2) Would discourage and decrease domestic production.
(3) Would cause a marked decline in domestic exploration
and development.
(4) Would, because of the time lag between exploration
and production, leave the nation years away from the
attainment of any emergency supply of fuel.
The Committee declared that it had considered the foreign
policy aspects of limiting petroleum imports, as well as the




imports on the later group was rationalized by declaring that
excessive reliance on the low cost imported oil may put the
consumer in a long~term vulnerability of facing a shortage and
possible unavailability.
Recommendat i ons . In view of the foregoing, it was recom-
mended, commencing the last half of 1957 and the first half of
1958, that all large importing companies who were importing into
Districts I~IV cut back imports to 10% below their average for
the years 1954, 1955 and 1956. Small importers (those who had
imported less than 20,000 barrels per day in 1954) were not
asked for percentage cuts, but were requested to import as per
submitted schedule, and in any case, not to exceed 12,000 b/d
94
over their 1956 imports.
No requested restrictions were recommended for District V
at this time as the level of imports was considered to be within
the difference between market demand and domestic production. It
was planned, however, to review the District V situation in about
six months and the entire situation every year, at least.
The overall requested restrictions were calculated to
maintain a ratio between imports and domestic production of




Provision was made for fitting new importers into the total
scheme. It was recognized that the plan might be circumvented
by the transfer of allotments, oil sale and product purchase
agreements, and by importation of products rather than crude, so
the Office of Defense Mobilization was enjoined to observe the
situation. It was recommended finally that the Department of
the Interior, under policy guidance from the Office of Defense
Mobilization, administer the plan.
The foregoing recommendations were put into effect on 29
95
July 1957. Interior Secretary Fred A. Seaton requested and
obtained the services of Captain Matthew V. Carson, Jr., U.S.
96
Navy, to administer the program.
95. White House Memorandum for Secretary of the Interior and
Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization, 29 July
1957. It is interesting that this plan would be put into
effect when the analysis of the problem and the answer to
it was slanted differently by the English trade newspaper.
Petroleum Press Service, in an article titled, **Lagging
U.S. Reserves". (Vol. XXIV, No. 5, May 1957) it was pointed
out that "merely to maintain the present ratio between
U.S. domestic production and reserves, and between prod-
uction and imports in the period up to 1965, for example,
would require an average annual rate of gross additions to
proved reserves about 50% higher than in recent years.**
(p. 169) It was generally concluded that rising imports
would be needed.
96. Capt. Carson was once counsel and Director of the Office
of Naval Petroleum Reserves.
37.

The System of Control
.
As has been seen above, the goal of restriction based on
the 29 July 1957 recommendations (which were adopted by the
President on the same day) was not to roll back imports to a
figure pegged on the 1954 imports, but to take into the account all
imports for the years 1954, 1955 and 1956 in fixing the import
quota.
The recommendations represent an important step in definition
of the proper balance between imports and domestic security and
in definition of the point where imports begin to effect nation-
al security. A judgment was reached that 17.8% of imports to
crude oil production (in all Districts) was too much in the way
of imports. This was to serve as a starting point and as
precedent for the same type of administrative judgments that
were to be made when the program became mandatory. Although what
transpired during the voluntary system of control will not be
legally binding upon what will transpire under the mandatory
program, the voluntary system of control afforded a good
opportunity as a proving ground of what was reasonable in the
way of restriction. That is to say, if controls were reasonable
enough to beget cooperation under a voluntary program, the same area
of reasonability, with its defined periphery, would likely be




Based upon the evidence of records and schedules and
submitted by the established importers, allowed imports for each,
expressed in thousands of barrels daily and calculated upon the
formula that was applicable to Districts I- IV, were set up.
For example, Sinclair was found to have a 3 year average of
69.1 thousands of b/d. The imports per formula were thus 69.1
minus 6.9 or 62.2 thousands of b/d. The new and small importers
97
were treated in the manner as recommended.
No sanctions were provided for refusal to comply with the
allowed imports. The desire of the industry to stay as free
as possible from control, plus whatever patriotic suasion was
generated by the knowledge that imports had been found to pose
a threat to national security, were expected to achieve
98
cooperation. Lacking cooperation, the program would never have
gained headway.
At the outset, provision was made to hear appeals of those
companies who claimed inequitable treatment and Captain Carson
r@c©iv@cl initial encouraging information from most companies,
99
indicating their willingness to participate.
97. See text at page 36 , supra .
98. Oil & Gas J., August 19, 1957, p. 97.
99. Oil & Gas J., August 12, 1957, p. 71. Sun Oil Company
said flatly that it was afraid of anti-trust laws
and would not comply. Others failed to state specifically
what they intended to import.
39.

Forms, the sine qua non of the regulators and the bane of
the regulated, were prepared for obtaining records of each
company's actual monthly imports and planned imports. Effective
April 1958, certificates of compliance were issued to importing
firms. An importing firm was not in compliance if it exceeded
its established allocation in any 3 consecutive months.
Even though the program was from the outset called 'Vol-
untary", it was realized by all concerned that the overtones of
compulsion were present. For instance, all of the results of the
program were to be published. Thereby a "violator** would be made
known to the public. Further it was realized that statutory machinery
was available to be called in to assist in requiring instead of
requesting, by the same agency that was then requesting. The
100
IPAA had no illusions about the program being completely voluntary.
Operation and Success of the Program.
Regulation for District V. It will be recalled that, by the
recommendations of the first report of the Special Committee to
Investigate Crude Oil Imports, no restrictive action was called
for in District V. However, this Committee reappraised the
100. Oil & Gas J., August 12, 1957, p. 74. See also, Oil &
Gas J., July 22, 1957, p. 47, wherein it was stated that
the voluntary program would be "backed up by the gun of
public opinion and the threat of government enforced
*»8 • • • •
40.

situation as they indicated they would, in December of
101
1957.
They found that the programmed imports for the first half
of 1958 were 348,800 b/d. This was upon the basis of information
submitted to the Administrator, Captain Carson. It was also
found that the deficit between production and estimated demand
was approximately 220,000 b/d. This required a reduction of 37%
of programmed imports. It was recommended, as before with Districts
I- IV, that the cuts be made on a percentage ratio of previous
imports. For the majors in District V, this amounted to 15% of
the 1956-57 daily average. The small and new importers were also
given special treatment in District V.
The Office of Defense Mobilization and Department of Interior
were cautioned to watch for indirect non-compliances with the
recommended formulae. The President directed all the recommended
102
action to be placed into effect.
103
Special J^omnuttee Report of 24 March 1958. This re-
port was a review of the voluntary plan to date and was again
101. Report of Special Committee to Investigate Crude Oil
Imports, December 12, 1957 (no pagination).
102. White House Memorandum for the Secretary of the Interior
and the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization,
December 12, 1957.
103. This report is titled "Supplemental Report" of the Special
Committee to Investigate Crude Oil Imports, March 24, 1958.
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concerned with Districts I-IV. The Committee found that all
but three "substantial importers" had complied with the vol-
untary program, and that in a number of instances, companies
104
did not import the full amount of their assigned quotas.
Keeping of the voluntary program was recommended. It was
noted that the industry had not yet bounced back from the post
Suez let down. The original 12% ratio of imports to production
105
was kept, with a resulting 8% required cut in current imports.
The Committee noted that it had anticipated that new im-
porters could be accommodated without curtailing the established
importers. This was because of an expected increasing rate of
production. Production having declined, it was announced that
established importers would have to "move over" to provide for
106
these newcomers.
As a measure to strengthen the voluntary program, it was
107
recommended that the provisions of the Buy American Act be
incorporated in the procurement contracts of all agencies of
108
the government purchasing petroleum under contract. This,
then, was a tacit admission that- some help was needed to acc=
104. Jd. at 1.
105. Oil & Gas J.. f March 31, 1956, p. 50.
106 „ :d^_Mi.° supra note 103, at 3.
107. Buy American Act, 41 U.S.C. llOa-lOc (1933), as amended
41 U.S.C. iiod (1949).
108 o This was implemented bv Executive Order 10761 of 27 March
1958, 23 Fed.. Reg. 2067 (1958). So anyone selling petroleum
products to any agency of the United States had to agree
to the following provision: "The contractor agrees that
during the contract period he will comply in all respects
with the Voluntary Oil Import Program. '
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sh the aim of restricted imports.
The recommendations of the Committee were approved by the
109
President on 25 March 1958.
The program was undergoing obvious stress, but had mana-
ged to hold .together. Congress was in session and some wanted
110
stronger import controls. Further, the industry was not as
111
healthy economically as had been expected.
Nine Months Appraisal. The dual headlines of "Tough Im-
112
port Plan Fading in Congress" and "Voluntary Import Plan
113
97% Effective" had obvious kinship. That is to say, the
success of the voluntary program was a large factor in the
avoidance of congressionally fixed, arbitrary and mandatory
quotas. This, coupled with probably congressional unwilling-
ness to tackle a factually and politically tough problem re-
sulted in the 1958 legislation which put the burden on the
114
Executive to do the restricting.
109. White House Memorandum for the Secretary of the Interior,
March 25, 1958, For the tabulated effect of the recommend-
ations as they pertained to each company, see Oil & Gas J.,
March 31, 1958, p. 51.
110. Oil & Gas J., May 5, 1958, p. 75.
111. U.S. Oil Makes Heavy Going. Petroleum Press Service, March
1958, Vol. XXV, No. 3., p. 84, 85: "The essence of U.S.
producers' present difficulties lies in the extent to
which they have over-extended their productive capacity,
some of which though profitable, is quite uneconomic
when measured against imports."
112. Oil & Gas J., May 5 V 1958, p. 74.
113. Jd. at 75.
114. See text at page 28, supra.
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The Administrator, Capt. Carson, was apparently pleased
with the 97% effectiveness of the program and complimented
the complying companies for their "business statesmanship.**
Two of the three leading companies who had failed to previously
comply with the program appeared ready to stay within the quotas
set by the formula. Only one persisted in the disregard of quotas.
This importer, Eastern States Petroleum and Chemical Corporation,
had contracted for more foreign oil than its officers had requested
quotas for. Apparently, being unable to replace a lost Japanese
sales outlet, the Company was caught with an excess of imports.
While trying to arrange for a market, the Company put its excess
in bonded storage in accordance with the Customs rules. When it
found itself in non-compliance with the program (after it had no
more storage available), the Company also found itself in the
position of losing two government contracts and the loss of
future government contracts because of the President's Executive
Order which brought the Buy American Act in to support the voluntary
115
oil import program. The Company, unsuccessful in its attempts to
have the quota revised through the appeals procedure to the Admin-
istrator, attacked the legality of Executive Order 10761 of
27 March 1958, as well as the propriety of the action of the
Administrator in refusing a revised quota. The District Court
115. See text at notes 107 and 108.

first dismissed Eastern's motion for preliminary injunction,
finding thai the Executive Order was lawful both under the
Buy American Act and under the Government *s power to buy from
116
whomever it pleased. The Court of Appeals of the District
of Columbia reversed, as the tendered issue of the arbitrary
action in the implementation of the Voluntary Oil Import
117
Program should have been considered. This was considered later ,
and the Administrator's refusal was specifically found to be not
so arbitrary as to warrant a preliminary injunction against the
government to restrain cancellation of government procurement
contracts. While a hardship undoubtedly existed, the administrator
had apparently determined that such had arisen as a result of the
company's business judgment and private contractual difficulties.
Upon a short review of the facts of the case, the court found that
there was '"ample evidence" to sustain the Administrator.
It is difficult to see how the action of the Administrator
could have been otherwise and also consistent with a fair policy
toward all importers. If internal difficulties of an importing
company were to serve as a springboard for preferential treatment,
116. Eastern States Petroleum & Chem. Co., v. Seaton, 163 F„
Supp. 797 CD C C 1958.9.
117. Eastern States Petroleum & Chem. Co., v. Seaton, 165 F.
Supp. 363 CD.C. 1958) For a related case concerning
Eastern's attempt to test taxation statute on oil imports,
see Eastern States Petroleum Corp. v. Rogers, 265 F. 2d
593 CD.C. Cir. 1959).
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an equitable allocation among all would soon be a thing of the
past. The judgment of the court is therefore considered sound.
In reaching such a conclusion, one must not be unmindful of the
very real hardship that must have been placed upon Eastern which
endeavored, apparently as long as it could (and consistently with
its contractual arrangements) to comply with the program. Hardship,
however, is not unusually a predicate of regulation as regulation
must strike a balance to achieve its goal. The direct effect of
the striking of the balance is to curtail freedom of those regulated.
Mid 1958 Reports bv Special Committee to Investigate Crude
Oil Imports. By June, 1958, petroleum products importations in
Districts I-IV were giving the Special Committee some concern.
They had found that while crude importation was being kept
within tolerable limits, the voluntary import program was
being threatened by the importation of products. As a conse-
quence, it was recommended that the Administrator commence a
voluntary system to govern the importation of unfinished gasoline
118
and other unfinished oil. At that time it was concluded that
residual fuel oil and miscellaneous product imports did not
constitute a threat to the voluntary program, but the Director
of the Office of Defense Mobilization and the Administrator were
118. Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Crude Oil
Imports, June 4, 1958 These recommendations were approved
by White House Memorandum for the Secretary of the Interior




asked to keep the situation with respect to petroleum products
119
under constant review.
With respect to District V, the June 30 report of the
Special Committee found that the imports into this District
had been less than the limit set. It therefore recommended
that the 221,100 b/d ceiling remain and that the allocation
for new importers and increases granted be within that overall
figure. These recommendations were approved by the President
120
on 1 July 1958.
VOLUNTARY TO MANDATORY-- IN TRANSIT
An objective appraisal of a program wherein the importers
"voluntarily 00 tightened their import belts in order to bring
about a healthy result to the economy and in furtherance of
national security must include the adjective "successful**. It
was a success to get the program operating at all. The 97%
effectiveness figure could not, of course, have been attained
without excellent cooperation of the industry.
With the aid of hindsight, it can now be seen that as the
program's success was a-growing, pressures were a-building which
would lead to a logical and short step to further control as
1959 approached.
119. Id. at 3.
120. White House Memorandum for the Secretary of the Interior
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Districts X~IV importers were multiplying and claiming a
share of the total "allowable 00 b/d imports to that area. This
meant that the major importers were having to reduce their
121
quotas to make room. How long the majors would be willing
to absorb the resolution of inequities of small importers, at
122
the formers' expense, was a delicate question. Add to this
circumstance the combination of many others and the seams of
the voluntary program would be expected to receive strain and
stress, if not to burst. Items: (1) Eastern was unhappy (to
the point of litigation) with even the voluntary program, (2)
The Mid-Year 1958 Oil and Gas Journal report showed:
Ca) Refiiniery runs had to be cut in order to reduce
123
tiis—runs barely exceeded 1955s.
[b) Production drop for first half (1958) was over 1
million b/d lower than comparable period for
121. Oil & Gas Jo, Jim* 23, 1958. p. 80.
122. Ibid. The words of De Chazeau and Kahn, Integration and
Compftitloji, in_^the,Petroleum .Industry. 248 (1959), become
prophetic here: ""Since this method of control can only
become increasingly burdensome and arbitrary as the num=
ber of firms in possession or potential possession of
foreign oil grows, quotas must be regarded as no better
than a stop-gap measure. 90





(c) Free foreign production exceeded U.S. output by
125
more than 2 million b/d.
(d) Imports of products other than residual fuel
126
gained 119% over the previous year.
(e) About 50 newcomers (importers) were looking for
127
quotas.
(3) With oil just beginning to show a climb out of the doldrums
128
indicated in M (2)°* above, pressure for protection of domestic
industry and prices was a predictable sequel.
As the year 1958 went on, requests for import quotas kept
129
coming in. The total amount of requested daily boosts in
imports (Districts I«=IV) went to, approximately 1 million b/d.
This is a large increase considering that the daily quota for
130
those Districts was, at that time, 713, 100 b/d. Coal men
and independents were concerned about the rise in imports of
131
refined products and wanted curbs. August and September imports
124. Jd. at 138.
125. Op,., cit., supra note 121, at 140.
126. Op^.cit, jjUHEJ. nc*%,® 121, at 142.
127. Pp., j i t ._ju_pra note 121, at 105.
128. Op... cit
,.
sjipra note 121, at 100.
129. Jmeort^Quota^ Bids JtoJhyroM* Oil & Gas J., August 11, 1958,
p. 78.
130. Ibid.
131. Oil & Gas J., August 18, 1958, p. 105.
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of ©ritade arid unfinished oils were above quota; Eastern States,
having lost its court battle, was importing almost 4 times its
quota; and a new plan, setting quotas on the basis of historical
132
imports combined with refinery runs was being considered. As
1958 drew to a, close, a coal state Congressman, James E. Van Zandt
of Pennsylvania announced plans to have Congress set quotas,
declared that Congress never should have thrust the job of
regulating imports upon the Executive, and was reported as
favoring a cutback in residual imports in order to bring "new
133
hope" to coal miners.
That a revamping of the voluntary import program was in all
liklihood to come was verified by an interim report of the
Special Committee to Investigate Oil Imports, on 22 December
134
1958. The Committee reported that it was engaging in an
intensive review of the program and was going to present certain
recommendations for change. Pending submission of those recom-
mendations, the Committee desired that importers be advised that
132. Oil & Gas J., November 3, 1958, p. 48.
133. Oil & Gas J., December 29, 1958, p. 73.
134. Approved by White House Memorandum for the Secretary of
the Interior on December 22, 1958.
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no changes would be made through February 28, 1959 in crude
oil allocations, and that they also be requested to limit
their importation of unfinished gasoline and other unfinished
oils to the present allocations.
MANDATORY PHASE OF REGULATION
jfechinejX-Of-Ig!Blgm^ntinQ Mandatory Phase.
In accordance with the Trade Agreements Extension Act of
135
actions of the Special Committee, the Director of
the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, the Secretary of
State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the President combined
to implement this new phase of regulation. It should be recalled
that the Act itself does not require mandatory controls, but
136
that such controls could be imposed by the will of the President.
Actions^Taken,,,
At the instance of the Special Committee, the Secretary
of State and the Deputy Secretary of Defense requested that
the Director of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization,
pursuant to the Trade Agreements Extension Act, make an appropriate
investigation to determine the effects on the national security
137
of imports of crude oil and its derivatives and products.
135. See text at page 25..
136. 72 Stat. 673 (1958), 19 U.S.C.A. 1352 aCb).
'. Report of Special Committee to Investigate Crude Oil
>rts, March 6, 1959.
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This investigation was undertaken by the Director on
138
28 January 1959. The Director reviewed the program and
concluded that notwithstanding the effectiveness of the voluntary
limitation plan, the quantities and circumstances of oil imports
had not been stabilized. With particular mention of crude oil
derivatives and products, it was cautiously tendered that there
had been a circumvention of the limitation program. It was opined
that imports had been a major contributing factor to the decline in
drilling operations. The voluntary program was given credit for
curtailing what would have been importation in drastic quantities.
World oversupply was noted with a statement that without control,
there would be substantial economic incentives to increase
imports. In a supplemental memorandum, the Director noted that
for the period 1954 to 1958 the domestic crude oil reserves were
139
increasing only 2.8% while demand for petroleum products
increased 15.5%. This indicated to him that an incentive for
exploration was needed. The determination was reached that
crude oil and the principal crude oil derivatives and products
were being imported in such quantities and under such circum-
as to threaten to impair the national security.
138. Director of Civil and Defense Mobilization, Memorandum
for the President, February 27, 1959.
139. Director of Civil and Defense Mobilization Supplemental
Memorandum for the President, March 4, 1959.
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With th© Director's recommendations in hand, the Special
Committee recommended on March 6, 1959 that the Voluntary Oil
Import Program be replaced by a mandatory program which would
Cl) limit imports and (2) distribute allocations among companies
140
in a Mfair and equal table manner. 08 Specific reasons for
the need of a mandatory program were?
(1) excessive imports by companies who had not complied
with the Voluntary Program
(2) a threat to the success of the Voluntary Program
because of increased importation of unfinished
oils and products.
(3) the liklihood of increased non-compliance among
companies now having allocations when they were
asked to cut back imports voluntarily in order to
provide allocations for newcomers to the program.
(4) the impossibility of working out a desirable and
legally permissible revision of the Voluntary Program
acceptable to the Committee.
si. The Committee then recommended
specifics for the mandatory program. It listed the
derivatives which should be controlled as well as crude.
. Report of Special Committee to Investigate Crude Oil





Districts I=IV imports were to be related to demand and the
limitation was to be about 9% of total demand in such Districts.
Within that maximum limit, imports of finished products were
not to exceed the 1957 level. In District V the imports were
to be sufficient to make up the difference between domestic
production and demand, again with derivatives and residual oil to
be used as fuel to be topped at the 1957 level. In general,
these amounts were to be subject to change by the Secretary of the
Interior in order to meet minimum requirements of refiners and to
meet the overfall objectives of the program as they pertained to
the imports of residual fuel oil to be used as fuel in Districts
I=IV.
In addition, Puerto Rican imports were to be watched. The
Secretary of the Interior was to restrict allocations to those
having refinery capacity in the U.S. Exchanges of foreign for
domestic crude and products were to be made only when advance
authorization was had for the same from the Secretary. Original
allocations were to be made to those companies who imported in
1957 and in the amounts imported by them during such period.
Controls were to become effective, at the latest, on 1 April 1959
and the Secretary of the Interior was to review allocations
every 6 months. It was also recommended that the Director and
the Secretaries of State, Defense, Treasury, Interior, Commerce,
54.

and Labor keep a close surveillance of imports which might
indicate the need for further Presidential action. An
appeal Board was recommended which was to be comprised of
a representative from the Departments of the Interior, Defense,
and Commerce, which said Board could alleviate hardship or
error or other special circumstances, but within the limits of
the maximum level of imports.
142
Executive Proclamation 3279 of 1 March 1959.
This proclamation of 10 March 1959 gave Presidential blessing
to a mandatory program. The recommendations of the Special
Committee, with more detail and definition, were adopted. The
Secretary of the Interior was authorized to issue regulations to
implement the program. Such regulations were to provide for the
revocation or suspension by the Secretary of any allocation or
license on grounds relating to the national security, or the
violation of the terms of the proclamation, or any regulation or
license issued pursuant to the proclamation.
143
The Executive Order providing for the Buy American phase
of the voluntary program, no longer needed, was revoked, and the
Special Committee was discharged.
142. 24 Fed. Keg. 1781 (1959).
143. 23 Fed. Reg. 2067
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As an example of how an inarticulate predicate of a
recommendation can facily become a firm criterion of regulation,
recall that the OCDM and the Cabinet Secretaries were, by the
Special Committee's recommendation, to keep a constant
surveillance
a
of imports, etc.. When that recommendation was
presented for the President's pen and signed, it had grown to
include:
00
In the ©went jgrices. of crude oil or its products
of derivatives should be increased after the effective
date.... such surveillance shall include a determination
of whether such increase or increases are necessary to
144
accomplish the national security objectives....'*
(Emphasis added) ,
The President's statement in issuing the Proclamation
noted his regret in having to make the system mandatory because
of the unwillingness of a few to join in the voluntary program.
Actually it was a rather painless step to take as it would serve
to equalize responsibility among all and would benefit those who




The Oil Import Regulation implementing the Presidential
144. Presidential Proclamation 3279 of 10 March 1959, §6(a),
24 F<ftd.Reg.076L It is hazarded that this was included by
work of the staff. No other 'explanation for its inclusion
has been found.
145. 24 Fed. Reg. 1907 (1959).
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Proclamation was issued soon after (March 13, 1959) by the
Secretary of the Interior. Its pattern of allocation was as
recommended and discussed above. Allocations were made accord-
ing to past refinery inputs and past imports, in an effort to
146
more equitably distribute the allocations. Sections 19 and
20 contain the teeth of control as they relate to criminal
penalties and revocation or suspensions of licenses.
Clarifications were soon made with respect to unfinished
147
oil importation and proper method of exchanges (oil for oil
148
only—not oil for money or for credit). Also, the Oil Import
149
Appeals Board was authorized to make its own procedural rules;
150
Proclamation number 3279 was modified; and notice of
151
miscellaneous amendments was given on 28 May 1959. From
this emanated the June 6, 1959 "Oil Import Regulation 1
/Revision l/.
146. Id. at § §10 and 11.
147. 24 Fed. Reg. 2361 (March 19, 1959).
148. 24 Fed. Reg. 2361 (March 24, 1959).
149. 24 Fed. Reg. 3527 (April 3, 1959).
150. 24 Fed. Reg. 3527 (May 1, 1959). By this, products entering
the U.S. by pipelines or overland means were exempted from
restriction. This was primarily for the mutual benefit
of District V and Canada. The President announced on
April 30 that this was in the interests of joint defense
of the hemisphere and that Venezuela and other Western
Hemisphere countries had not been forgotten (April 30,
1959 press release by Hagerty, Press Secretary to the
President.
)
151. 24 Fed. Reg. 4379 (1959).
152. 24 Fed. Reg. 4654 (1959). This was amended on August 14, 1959
by revising the definition of refinery inputs to conform to
paragraph (c) of il of Presidential Proclamation 3290,
(24 Fed. Reg. 3527 (1959)). See Appendix II.
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The launching of the mandatory phase of the program was
153
perhaps made more propitious by a rising domestic demand.
The first half of 1959 demand was 6.4% over the first half of
1958 demand. It was thus possible to launch the mandatory
program with a 30,000 b/d increase, making the July 1 to
154
December 31, 1959 allowable at 1,450,362 b/d. Mandatory controls
were no panaceas for old plagues, however. By the end of July 81
155
petitions for revisions in import quotas had been filed.
This amounted to about 1/3 of the importers. For those who were
not in accord with the philosophy of quotas, as compared to some
other method of control, a mandatory program vice a voluntary one,
156
offered no succor.
Eastern States Petroleum and Chemical Corporation was still
not satisfied with its particular quota and again sought the
157
assistance of a federal court. Two cases, styled Texas-
American Asphalt Corp. v. Walker and Eastern States Petroleum
& Chemical Corporation v. Walker, were decided by the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Texas on 18 September
158
1959. Both plantiffs sought declaratory judgments and
153. Mid-Year Report, Oil & Gas J. , June 27, 1958, p. 132.
154. Oil & Gas J., June 15, 1959, p. 61.
155. Op.^jsrt^ supra note 151, at 120.
156. De Chazeau & Kahn, Integration and Competition in the
Petroleum „ Industry 253 (1959 )s "Imposition of compulsory
quota controls in March 1959 represented a more forthright
course of action; but it makes no more economic sense than
the policy it supplanted."
157. Oil & Gas J., June 15, 1959. p. 63.




injunctions against the Collector of Customs to restrain
him from enforcing the mandatory program. Texas- American,
a newcomer to refining, had no history of refinery input.
Texas-American, although not unaware of the forthcoming restrict-
ions in 1959, entered into a contract to buy a special type
of Venezuelan crude for its asphalt plant, called Bachaquero
crude. The regulation, when it came out, would only permit the
granting of allocations to those with a history of refinery inputs.
Claiming hardship, Texas-American asked for a quota in order that
it might fulfill its contract to purchase the Bachaquero oil.
The quota was refused on the ground that there was no history of
refinery inputs. While the action was brought to test the validity
of the administrative ruling denying a license and an allocation,
the holding of the case was that the Administrator and the Appeals
Board were indispensable parties. Although in the nature of dicta,
the court discussed the merits of the case and declared:
(1) That the President had not acted arbitrarily or
capriciously in causing the regulations to be made;
(2) That the Administrator correctly construed the
regulations; and
(3) That no one had any vested right to carry on foreign
commerce and that governmental regulation of foreign
commerce, if based upon congressional policy, was
not invalid, even if it resulted in the regrettable




Another issue raised by Texas "American was based upon
Section 12 of the then current regulations, which provided the
authority to allocate imports of crude by a refiner who was unable
to obtain quantities of domestic crude oil by ordinary and
continuous means, such as barges, pipelines or tankers,
"sufficient to meet his minimum requirements'*. To this
sufficiency, Texas -Ameri can would have read into the regulations the
words "efficiently and economically". The court pointed out,
however, that Texas°American was able to obtain domestic crude
continuously. The circumstance that the type of crude locally
and continuously obtainable was not the best and most economical
type for the Company's operation did not require the Administrator
the grant an allocation. This again is an example of reasonable
regulation which by its very nature creates individual hardship
as the equities are averaged.
Eastern States Petroleum, on the other hand, had a history
of refinery inputs, but desired a larger allocation than had been
granted. As in the Texas-American case, the holding turned on
the indispensability of parties. Eastern declared that it was
not challenging the validity of Proclamation 3279 or of the oil
import regulation, but was just seeking an adjustment in its
allocation, on the grounds of hardship. The essence of the
hardships were that the Company had failed to include all of
60.

its planned imports in its submitted estimate and that it was
exporting some of its imports, for which it was not receiving
credits against imports. The court pointed out that there was
no regulation providing for export credits, thus implying
support of the refusal of the Oil Import Appeals Board to grant
any relief on that score. Further, the court declined to
invade the administrative function of finding whether there was
any hardship that would merit special consideration.
In both cases the District Court noted that it was passing
judgment on the merits because of the liklihood of appeal. Due
to the firmly established congressional power of regulation of
foreign commerce, as well as its power with regard to national
security, a wholesale attack upon the program of mandatory
restrictions is not likely to meet with success. While further
litigation is to be expected, it is most likely to be confined
to that narrow field where, under present administrative law,
there is an occasional chance of success, i.e., the arbitrari-
ness or capriciousness of the regulations or the administration
thereof.
It therefore appears that a lawful, reasonable and perhaps
manageable system of equitably allocating imports has evolved
from the 30 years of national concern over the problem. It is
the opinion of government experts that the voluntary program
61,

averted severe economic difficulties in the oil industry.
Whether the industry would whole-heartedly join in such a
conclusion is problematical (for some are importers and
some are not) but the continued support of the oil states
for import restrictions indicates, from a practical standpoint,
that the majority of industry members (in a political sense)
159
is for oil import restrictions. And they want more. On the
other hand, the Oil Compact Commission is keeping a close watch
on the coal-industry backed '"national fuels policy", undoubtedly
to see that the coal industry does not obtain any synthetic
support in its competition with petroleum, via imports or any
160
other method.
Perhaps one of the most difficult administrative problems
of the program will be to keep its function within the intended
scope of its creation, i.e., for the purpose of national (and
now hemispheric) security. Pressures for changing the mold of
the program will inevitably be generated from ""grass roots"
159. The Dallas Morning News, 5 December 1959, ll, p. 8, col.
4. Here Senator Yarborough CD-Texas ) was reported as
describing the mandatory oil import program as wa
slender reed. ...We need a stronger basis for the
control of oil imports than this."
160. The New York Times, 4 December 1959, p. 45, Col. 4s
""Compact^Urge s C los^Jajc^h^o^J^ueJ-S PolicxJtovernen t "
.
See also, MCj^JLJUmj__j.g__Pjd^^
Oil & Gas J., December 14, 1959, p. 41.
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economics as it affects politics of the same ilk. Unfortunately,
the voices of the guardians of the bigger, longer term picture,
while agreed with in principle, are drowned in the clamor of the
161
daily pursuit of the Yankee dollar. Admiral Rickover, one
of these voices, warned that our "belief that our high standard
of living guarantees political and military supremacy" is
162
potentially "our most dangerous illusion." We can certainly
ill-afford mistakes in many or large "pragmatic adjustments" when
it comes to our national security for they could mean the historic
difference between survival and requiem.
Ower^concern about prices is, in my opinion a large
threatened derailment of the true purposes of the regulation. As
163
mentioned heretofore, the matter of petroleum prices found
its way into the President's March 10th proclamation. This was
immediately picked up by a foreign trade journal, as "An entirely
novel aspect of the new imports controls which could have far
164
reaching results. ..." No amount of study of the raison d'etre
of import controls can justify the use of price controls in order
to curtail what someone considers to be excessive profits or, on
161. The Dallas Morning News, December 10, 1959, §j
o p 22, col,
1; "jUdcoj^r^SaxS3Jjjg,h . Liv i nonstandard JflaxJ^JUabi 1 ity^.
Admiral De^lgres_rj®clija® in„..U.TS <L_Natural Resources."
162. Jd. at p. 1, col. 2.
163. Op^--C^fcA=j:upra note 144.




the other hand, what someone envisions as an ""operation
,00bootstraps to protect an ailing and unable-to~compete~industry.
It would be truly ludicrous if the program were used for the
later purpose~~for if the industry were so ailing, then it
would be high time that we turn our efforts, national security
wise, into the stimulation of imports?
It may well be that rising demand will be the end of
government regulation in this field„ The import quotas for the
165
first half of I960 continue the trend of rising imports based
on percentage of total demand. What is happening in District V
may well be the prelude of what will happen in the other Districts.
There (District V) the demand keeps increasing, while domestic
production is not satisfying the need. Even with the exemption
of Canadian overland oil, the difference jumped from a 265,500
b/d deficit between supply and demand during the last half of
166
1959, to 279,000 b/d (estimated) during the first half of 1960.
Current periodicals and discussion groups are showing much
concern over the enormity of the geometric '"population explosion™.
Partial realizations of these predictions in the near future will
have an impact on the reserves of all our natural resources.




While one periodical sees Europe and the U.S.A. safely
through 1975, with petroleum and add it i onal impor t s
167
satisfying most of the demand, there will undoubtedly
be an increased flexibility of choice and use of products for
168
creation of energy as dictated by economics.
This all portends that government regulation may eventually
be, if at all, in the field of rationing imports, rather than
restricting them.
SUMMARY OBSERVATIONS
By the foregoing, an attempt has been made objectively
to synthesize the legal economic and political factors which have
contributed to the evolution of the segment of governmental
regulation of the oil and gas industry under study.
It is clear that if our policy and law makers saw the
problem in such a fashion that controls ought to be different,
then that the law jj, would be quickly changed to conform. Thus,
the role of the jurisconsult in this field is necessarily
167. Petroleum Press Service, Feb. 1960, Vol. XXVII, No. 2,
p. 41-43.
168. A present e^miple of this is the shift from oil to gas
and coal. See The Dallas Morning News, Feb. 28, 1960,
§4, p. 3, col. 1. At colo f-f the headline is, U»JU
Study Sejj^Xo_ngrRajigLe^Qil.Jte^d- n with a report that a
rise in demand in the U.S. from 1959° s 9,700,000 b/d
to 17,100, 000 b/d is predicted by 1976. Population
by that time is expected to reach 230,000,000.
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limited. Once he had developed the evolution and statutory
basis of oil import regulation, the job of framing the case for
change rests with those who would have the change, based upon
their facts and reasons whether they be political, economic or
military.
In this regard, the foregoing study reveals a plethora of
interests to be weighed in the regulation of oil imports and a
modicum of illumination of the correct paths to follow. Stated
otherwise, it demonstrates that we probably do not know the
answers to basic questions sufficiently well to forge conclusions
as to what policy changes, if any, should be made. Summarized
further and more cryptically, ""Wanteds constructive criticism,
conclusions and a denouement. °"
It would be desirable as a contribution to the welfare of
this country if one could conduct a legal examination of the
conflicting parameters in the import equation and offer a neatly
packaged solution which, after having balanced the interests of
the oil industry, the consumer and national defense, could tender
the best results for all. The writer does not pretend such
omniscience.
In a democracy such as ours, restrictions on the complete
freedom of one to deal with his share of our wealth of natural
resources have come to us through the process of reluctant
66.

evolution rather than experimental fiat. The individual voices
of the vox_j&ojPiiJLl sometimes cry out in indignant frustration
with such incantations as, "There ought to be a law!" or "Why
don't they do something about it?" As a chorus, however, the
3rox_jgopu li is more temperate and is not panacean in nature. The
role of the Federal government in the formulation of our oil
import policy has been described as pusillanimous, and has been
criticised for the lack of coordination and consistency. It
is difficult to see how it could be otherwise in its efforts to
satisfy all. It has reached no heights or penetrated to no
depths other than has been demanded of it. It is the best
product that our political processes have been able to manufacture
with the raw material furnished by our expert economists and our
defense establishment. State conservation policies do, of course,
play a part in the rate of production of petroleum and its
169
prices. Responsibility for the regulation of oil imports,
however belongs exclusively to the Federal government.
To the discerning, it should be abundantly clear from this
study that our policy difficulties have stemmed largely from the
dichotomous desires of keeping our oil and using it, too.
The facts here are eloquent without any additional articulation.
An umbrella of policy attempting to satisfy both of these desires
must, by its nature, be ad hoc, pragmatic, arad as tractable as
crisis demands.
16 l3. See text at p. H
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Paradoxical as it may seem, the cautious policy with
respect to these bifurcated goals is proceeding successfully
without any notable detriment to the country, to the industry, or
to the national defense. Complacence, however, is not a logical
predicate. This is because the present success will continue
only so long as the dimension of time and abundance of resources
do not demand an immediate accounting." c**t there's the rub.
When an immediate accounting looms necessary, it may be too
late. A boy never knows how many green apples it takes to make
him sick until he has completed his experiment. Happily, he is
likely to recover from his reckless prodigality and live to be
the wiser. When time and abundance of domestic resources reveals
that our consumption is rapidly overtaking supply of petroleum,
the prognosis for the continued welfare of the Nation is not as
good as the little boy's. Legislation, belt tightening or late
arriving wisdom will not replace the irreplaceable. The illusion
about which Admiral Rickover spoke, i.e., that our high standard
of living guarantees political and military supremacy, will have
111
been dissipal
This brings the wedding of national defense to a healthy-
industry under the spotlight of examination. At this point.
ISO* See text at p. 20 and footnote 57.
17i» See text at p. 63.
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politics and economics appear on the scene. "'What's good for
X industry is good for the country 00 has been recently a popular
(and maligned) slogan summarizing our abiding faith in our
capitalistic system. As noted in the text, this philosophy
has been criticized by Senator Douglas as containing an ""implicit
syllogism90 which concludes that the health of every industry
is complementary of our total economic welfare and national
defense. While one may generate a chuckle out of the niche
that pregnant mare's urine occupies in his examples of protected
products, he must be sobered when considering a replaceable
product jo s
.JtJLt§» a wasting and irreplaceable one. Many a
pauper has arrived at his status by contributing too vigorously to
the national economy by freely circulating his money. This does
not change his status as a pauper. Likewise it must be conceded
that a healthy petroleum industry contributes to the general
welfare of the country. But the unanswered and unknown is how
soon such prosperity,, dependent upon consumption will, by the
momentum of its enterprise, hurl itself out of existence. When
this occurs, the ruin will not be confined to the petroleum
industry. It will cripple the entire country unless by that




This brings us to the moment of truth, the point wheire the
wealth of the petroleum interests for the present is in conflict
with the welfare of the country in the future. Unless one is
thoroughly dedicated to the present and the dollar, there can be
no quibbling about whether the nation or the petroleum industry
should suffer. The industry has no vested rights of supremacy
to the detriment of all. Quarrels about whether it is wise to
maintain reserves in the ground for the purpose of national
defense must be stripped bare and the intent of the proponents
revealed. Greed and avarice did not cease with Teapot Dome.
Should we, therefore, rest content on the conclusions of
the Special Committee to Investigate Oil Imports which, inter
alia, rejected as unsound the outright encouragement of increased
172 Timports in order to conserve domestic reserves? , l say w®
should not. A large part of the committee's rationale was in
173
my opinion, dedicated to solicitude toward the industry.
The interests of the nation and the consumers were subordinated and
rationalized.
Continued re-examination of our policy is recommended in
the hope that it may be molded to coincide with cogency, con-
172. See text at p. 34-35.
173. Perhaps the industry is in continued need of solitude as
of the first half of I960. See '"What the Crude Market
is up against 00
,
Oil & Gas J O0 May 23, I960, p. 61.
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servation and conscience. If it be decided that a hedge on the
safe side will best serve everyone, then everyone can share in
the cost of conservation rather than take the gamble on having
174
the consumer and the nation bear the cost of protection.
We should continue to examine courses of action that have been
rejected as 'being too costly, as presenting too many physical
problems and as ""contrary to the principles of free enterprise
175
which characterize American industry 00 ,, That is, we should
continue to seriously consider such courses of action as i Cl)
importing foreign crude into the U.S. and storing it in completed
fields or elsewhere and, (2) enlarging government participation
in exploring for oil reserves which would be shut in when
discovered. Furthermore, if the petroleum industry is found to
be ailing as a result of an overabundance of free imports,
perhaps a better way to treat the industry would bes Cl) let it
suffer until better days (which are sure to arrive) when imports
will be welcomed by all or (2) if the industry must be aided
through a period when imports are hurting it, we should consider
a type of subsidy which involves financial support only—that is
a financial support that is not predicated upon an accelerated
withdrawal of our petroleum reserves.
174. See text at p. 13rl4 s
175o See text at p. 34.

Thus the problem clariy points up, from the jurisprudential
side of legislative policy, that the most static part of the
problem is the varied opinion. To a large extent these differ-
ences of opinion are likely to continue until opinions are dis-
placed by facts. To aid in the formulation of legislative
policy the military and the economists have the task of
developing these facts. In the mean time, it is probably the
wiser course of the law to remain static.
National security pervades much of our current foreign
and domestic policy today. As such, national defense and
security is a handy whipping boy, either pro or con, on a
variety of subjects. The legal history of the present import
regulations shows that national defense considerations were said
to have been a prime factor in the present system of regulation.
Upon such a thesis, we are now proceeding. Is it wrong?
Will a future war last long enough for us to be concerned
about vast reserves of oil'? .If not, will our oil reserves have
dwindled to such a point that we could not sustain even a short
war? How frequently and of what duration may we expect ""brush
fire 00 wars? Are we better gamblers than Nazi Germany was,
recalling that a Nazi Germany decided upon a weighted judgment
to start a war '(a decision the U.S, would probably never
make) and found out. that when petroleum supplies failed,
72.

the end came? Will the atom and solar energy sources antiquate
the use of petroleum as an energy source of Importance before
petroleum reserves are depleted?
And further, what about the over-all problem of foreign
oil development by American companies? Should this endeavor be
encouraged or discouraged? How are the values of statemanship
and national interest going to be fitted into the mosaic of
economic reality?
If government encourages foreign oil development and then
regulates imports in such a fashion as to deny swift recovery
of the investment, the investment is placed in jeopardy and
government policy is ripe for criticism. If, on the other hand,
foreign oil development is officially discouraged, a void for
Russian exploitation will have been created and a greater burden
of drain will have been placed upon our domestic reserves.
Breaking the unknowns down further into practical economics,
should we favor the few large integrated companies who gain more
from imports than the independents, or the independents who seem
to wield more political power? How should quotas be affected
by our foreign policy. If at all? And militarily, do we have
any real hope of evading foreign submarines with our tankers,
should the need arise? If so, how bright are our chances in




A look at the map and a cursory knowledge of Russia's
ambitions and capabilities of mustering a huge land force does
not gi?e one cause for optomism. But, the independents would
not conclude therefrom that we should accelerate importation of
Middle Eastern Oil.
And finally, what about the oil import regulation itself.
176
Is the quota system economically sound? Certain changes have
177
been made since its original writing and only time will tell
whether it will accomplish its intended purpose. In the meantime,
the lawyers and lawmakers should maintain an open and sympathetic
ear for any additional factual data that can be produced by the
industry, the politico-economists, and the military.
The studies cited in the foreward have made economic and
political appraisals touching on the answers to some of the
foregoing rhetorical questions. These have not resulted in
sufficient unanimity of conclusion to dictate that our policy
should be different from what it is. When, within the industry
itself, the majors imrge that freedom of imports will promote
national security amid the independents urge that more stringent
176. See text at p. 62 -
177. See text at p. 57.
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restrictions of imports will promote national security, one
must conclude that they cannot both be right and that "national
security" is given a meaning which is promotional of self interests.
This is a large part of the "problem" in the regulation of oil
imports.
The current legislation is flexible enough to meet whatever
is demanded of it in the way of increased or decreased imports.
Administrative changes can be made without any additional
legislation. The Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization is
charged with constant surveillance of the program, and it is the
forum through which any administrative recommendations for change





Oil Import Regulation 1 /Revision 1/
Sec.
1. Purpose.
2. Oil Import Administration.
3. Allocation periods.
4. Eligibility for allocations.
5. Applications for the allocation period Jan, 1. 1950,




9. Determination of quantities available for allocation—
Districts I-IV, District V.
10. Allocations of crude oil and unfinished oils—Districts I-IV.
11. Allocations of crude oil and unfinished oils—District V.
12. /Reserved/
13. Allocations of finished products—Districts I-IV, District V.
14. Determination of maximum level of imports—Puerto Rico.
15. Allocation of crude oil and unfinished oils—Puerto Rico.
16. Allocations of finished product!—Puerto Rico.
17. Use of imported crude oil and unfinished oils.
18. Reports.
19. False statements.
20. Revocation or suspension of allocations or licenses.
21. Appeals.
22. Definitions.
(Authority; Sees. 1 to 22 issued under Proc. 3279, as amended
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Sec. 1 Purpose.
These regulations implement Presidential Proclamation 3279,
"Adjusting Imports of Petroleum and Petroleum Products into the
United States," dated March 10, 1959 (24 F. R. 1781), as amended,
by providing for the discharge of the responsibilities imposed
upon the Secretary of the Interior.
Sec. 2 Oil Import Administration.
There is established in the Department of the Interior an
Oil Import Administration under the direction of an Administrator
77.

designated by the Secretary of the Interior. The Administrator
is hereby empowered to exercise, pursuant to this regulation,
all of the authority conferred upon the Secretary by Proclamation
3279, as amended, and the Administrator may redelegate such
authority.
Sec, 3 Allocation periods.
Allocations of imports of crude oil and unfinished oils will
initially be made for the period March 11, 1959 through June 30,
1959, Allocations of imports of finished products will initially
be made for the period April 1, 1959 through June 30, 1959.
Thereafter, allocations will be made for periods of six months—
that is, July 1 through December 31; January 1 through June 30.
Sec, 4 Eligibility for allocations.
(a) To be eligible for an allocation of imports of crude and
unfinished oils in Districts I- IV or in District V, a person must
(1) have refinery capacity in the respective districts and (2) in
respect of an allocation for the allocation period March 11, 1959
through June 30, 1959 have had refinery inputs in the respective
districts for the calendar year 1958 and (3) in respect of the
allocation period July 1, 1959 through December 31, 1959, and each
successive allocation period thereafter have had refinery inputs
in the respective districts for the year ending three months prior
to the beginning of the allocation period for which the allocation
is requested.
(b) To be eligible for an allocation of imports of crude oil and
unfinished oils for Puerto Rico, a person must have refinery
capacity in Puerto Rico and must have had refinery inputs in Puerto
Rico during the months of July, August, and September of the year
1958.
(c)(1) To be eligible for an allocation of imports of
finished products, other than residual fueld oil to be used as
fuel, i" Districts I- IV or District V, a person must have
imported such products into the respective districts during the
calendar year 1957.
(2) To be eligible for an allocation of imports of residual
fuel oil to be used as fuel into the respective districts during
the calendar year 1957.
(3) To be eligible for an allocation of imports of
finished products, other than residual fuel oil used as fuel,
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in Puerto Rico, a person must have imported such products into
Puerto Rico during the last half of the calendar year 1958.
(4) To be eligible for an allocation of imports of residual
fuel oil to be used as fuel in Puerto Rico, a person must have
imported residual fuel oil used as fuel into Puerto Rico during
the last half of the calendar year 1958.
Cd) A person is not eligible individually for an allocation
of crude oil and unfinished oils or finished products if the
person is « subsidiary or affiliate owned or controlled, by reason
of stock ownership or otherwise, by any other individual,
corporation, firm or other business organization or legal entity.
The controlling person and the subsidiary or affiliate owned or
controlled will be regarded as one. Allocations will be made to
the controlling person on behalf of itself and its subsidiary or
affiliate but, upon request, licenses will be issued to the
subisdiary or affiliate.
Sec. 5 Applications for the allocation period Jan. 1, 1960
through June 30, 1960, and successive periods.
With respect to the allocation period Jan. 1, 1960 through
June 30, 1960, and each successive allocation period thereafter,
an application for allocations of imports of crude oil and
unfinished oils or finished products must be filed with the
Administrator, in such form as he may prescribe, not later than
sixty calendar days prior to the beginning of the allocation
period for which the allocation is required, except that if the
sixtieth day is a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday, the application may
be filed on the next succeeding business day.
Sec. 6 Licenses.
(a) When an allocation has been made to a person under this
regulation, the Administrator shall, upon application in such form
as he may prescribe, issue a license or licenses based on the
allocation, specifying the amount of crude oil and unfinished
oils or finished products which may be imported, the period of
time such license shall be in effect, and the districts (Districts
I- IV, District V, or Puerto Rico) into which the importation may
be made. The Administrator may amend such licenses.
(b) No license issued pursuant to this section may be sold,
assigned, or otherwise transferred.
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Sec. 7 Small quantities.
(a) Collectors of Customs are authorized to permit without
a license baggage entries, and entries for consumption of small
quantities of crude oil, unfinished oils, or finished products
which are certified as samples for testing or analysis and
which do not exceed 110 gallons per entry.
(b) Persons desiring to import small quantities not covered
by paragraph (a) of this section should file with the Administrator
a request for an authorization for entry without a license for
each shipment describing the oil and quantity to be imported and
listing the port of entry.
Sec. 8 /Reserved/
Sec. 9 Determination of quantities available for allocation
—
Districts I-IV, District V.
(a) Prior to the beginning of each allocation period the
Administrator shall determine in accordance with the limitations
imposed by section 2 of Proclamation 3279, as amended, the quantities
of imports of crude oil and unfinished oils which are available for
allocation in Districts I-IV and in District V, respectively, and
the quantities of imports of residual fuel oil to be used as fuel
and of imports of finished products other than residual fuel
oil to be used as fuel which are available for allocation in
such districts.
(b) After each such determination the Administrator shall as
provided by these regulations make allocations to eligible
applicants for the appropriate allocation period.
Sec. 10 Allocations of crude oil and unfinished oils—Districts
I-IV.
(a) The quantity of imports of crude oil and unfinished oils
determined to be available for allocation in Districts I- TV for
the allocation period July 1, 1959 through December 31, 1959, shall
be allocated by the Administrator among eligible applicants as
provided in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section.
(b) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section,
each eligible applicant shall receive an allocation based on
refinery inputs for the year ending March 31, 1959 and computed
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according to the following schedule:










(c) If an eligible applicant has been importing crude oil
pursuant to an allocation under the Voluntary Oil Import Program
and if an allocation computed under paragraph (b) of this section
would be less than 75.7 per cent of the applicant's last allocation
of imports of crude oil under the Voluntary Oil Import Program, the
applicant shall nevertheless receive an allocation under this
section equal to 75.7 per cent of his last allocation of imports
of crude oil under the Voluntary Oil Import Program.
(d) No allocation made pursuant to this section shall entitle
a person to a license which will allow the importation of unfinished
oils in excess of 10 per cent of the allocation.
(e) No allocation made pursuant to this section may be sold,
assigned, or otherwise transferred.
Sec. 11 Allocations of crude oil and unfinished oils—District V.
(a) The quantity of imports of crude oil and unfinished oils
determined to be available for allocation in District V for the
allocation period July 1, 1959 through December 31, 1959 shall
be allocated by the Administrator among eligible applicants as
provided in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section.
(b) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section,
each eligible applicant shall receive an allocation based on
refinery inputs for the year ending Pfarch 31, 1959, and computed
according to the following schedule:
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* 200,000 Plus 8.0%
(c) If an eligible applicant has been importing crude oil
pursuant to an allocation under the Voluntary Oil Import Program
and if an allocation computed under paragraph (b) of this section
would be less than 80 per cent of the applicants last allocation
of imports of crude oil under the Voluntary Oil Import Program,
the applicant shall nevertheless receive an allocation under
this section equal to 80 per cent of his last allocation of
imports of crude oil under the Voluntary Oil Import Program.
(d) Allocations made pursuant to this section shall not permit
the importation of unfinished oils in excess of 10 per cent of the
permissible imports of crude oil and unfinished oils. With respect
to any allocation made pursuant to this section, the Administrator
upon request shall issue a license permitting the importation of
unfinished oils in an amount not in excess of 10% of the
allocation. If the total quantity of unfinished oils applied for
is less than 10% of the permissible imports of crude and unfinished
oils, the Administrator may to that extent increase the percentage
amount of unfinished oils specified in licenses of persons who
request such increases. Each person making such a request shall
receive an increase in the proportion that his allocation bears to
the total of allocations made to all persons requesting increases.
(e) No allocation made pursuant to this section may be sold,
assigned, or otherwise transferred.
Sec. 12 /Reserved/
Sec. 13 Allocations of finished products—Districts I-IV, District
V.
(a) The quantity of imports of finished products determined to
be available for allocation in Districts I-IV and in District V
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for any particular allocation period shall be allocated by the
Administrator to each eligible applicant in the proportion
that the applicant's imports of finished products during the
calendar year 1957 bore to the imports of such products during
that year by all eligible applicants. Separate allocations
shall be made for imports of residual fuel oil to be used as
fuel and for imports of finished products other than residual
fuel oil to be used as fuel.
(b) No allocation made pursuant to this section may be sold,
assigned, .or otherwise transferred.
Sec. 14 Determination of maximum level of imports—Puerto Rico.
(a) Pursuant to section 2 of the Proclamation 3279, it is
determined (1) that the average barrels per day of imports of
crude oil and unfinished oils into Puerto Rico during any particular
allocation period shall not exceed the average barrels per day,
as determined by the Administrator, during the months of July,
August, and September of the year 1958 of imports of such
commodities into Puerto Rico, and (2) that the average barrels
per day, as determined by the Administrator, of imports of residual
fuel oil to be used as fuel and of imports of finished products
other than residual fuel oil to be used as fuel into Puerto Rico
during any particular allocation period shall not exceed the
average barrels per day of imports of such products, respectively,
into Puerto Rico during the last half of the calendar year 1958.
(b) The Administrator shall from time to time review the
determinations set forth in paragraph (a) of this section and
shall recommend to the Secretary of the Interior that the level of
imports be increased or decreased as may be required to meet
increases or decreases in local demand in Puerto Rico or in demand
for export to foreign areas.
Sec. 15 Allocation of crude oil and unfinished oils—Puerto Rico,
(a) For the allocation period July 1, 1959 through December
31, 1959, the Administrator shall allocate to each eligible
applicant for an allocation for Puerto Rico quantities of imports
of crude oil and unfinished oils equal to the applicants average
barrels daily of refinery input (adjusted by the Administrator
for downtime) in Puerto Rico during the months of July, August
and September of the year 1958.
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(b) In the event that the maximum levels of imports of
crude oil and unfinished oils are increased or decreased
pursuant to paragraph (b) of section 14, the Administrator
shall increase or decrease individual allocations in the
proportion that each allocation bears to the total allocation
of crude oil and unfinished oils.
(c) No allocation made pursuant to this section may be sold,
assigned, or otherwise transferred.
Sec. 16 Allocations of finished products—Puerto Rico.
(a) For the allocation period July 1, 1959 through December
31, 1959, the Administrator shall allocate to each eligible
applicant for an allocation for Puerto Rico a quantity of imports
of finished products equal to the applicant's average barrels
daily of imports of such products during the last 6 months of
the calendar year 1958. Separate allocations shall be made for
imports of residual fuel oil to be used as fuel and of imports
of finished products other than residual fuel oil to be used as
fuel.
(b) In the event that the maximum level of imports of
residual fuel oil to be used as fuel or of finished products
other than residual fuel oil to be used as fuel is increased
or decreased pursuant to paragraph (b) of section 14, the
Administrator shall increase or decrease individual allocations
in the proportion that each allocation bears to the total
allocations of residual fuel oil to be used as fuel or of
finished products other than residual fuel oil to be used as
fuel, respectively.
(c) No allocation made pursuant to this section may be sold,
assigned, or otherwise transferred.
Sec. 17 Use of imported crude oil and unfinished oils.
(a) Each person who imports crude oil or unfinished oils
under a license issued pursuant to an allocation made under
sections 10, 11, or 15 of this regulation must process the
oils so imported in his own refinery, except that foreign
crude oil may be exchanged for either domestic crude oil or
domestic unfinished oils and foreign unfinished oils may be
exchanged for either domestic unfinished oils or domestic
crude oil for processing in such refinery if:
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(1) the exchange is not otherwise unlawful;
(2) the exchange is effected on a current basis
—
that is, not more than ninety days elapse
between the delivery of foreign and
domestic oil under the exchange agreement;
and
(3) the proposed exchange agreement is reported
to the Administrator before it is acted upon.
(b) All exchanges must be on an oil-for-oil basis and any
exchange involving adjustments, settlements, or accounting on
a monetary basis is not permissible and will not be approved by
the Administrator.
Sec. 18 Reports.
(a) Each person who imports crude oil, unfinished oils, or
finished products under a license issued under this regulation
shall report to the Administrator the quantities in barrels
corrected to 60° F of crude oil, unfinished oils, and finished
products so imported. Each report shall state through which
port of entry the importation was made and shall specify the
kinds of unfinished oils and finished products imported. Each
report should be filed with the Administrator within fifteen
days of the end of a particular month.
(b) Each person who exchanges oil pursuant to section 17 of
this regulation shall report to the Administrator identifying all
parties to the exchange agreement, stating the types and quantities
of foreign and domestic oil involved, and describing the basis
on which the exchange rests. Such reports must show that not
more than ninety days will elapse between the delivery of the
foreign and domestic oil. Such reports will be available for
public inspection. In addition, any changes occurring during an
allocation period in the types of oils or the exchange ratio
shall be reported. If an exchange agreement continues beyond the
allocation period during which it was consummated, a new report
should be filed at the beginning of each new allocation period.
Sec. 19 False statements.
Persons concealing material facts or making false statements
in or in connection with any applications or reports filed with
the Administrator or in connection with any license presented
to or statements made to a Collector of Customs with respect
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to imports of crude oil, unfinished oils, or finished products,
are guilty of a crime and upon conviction may be punished by
fine or imprisonment or both.
Sec. 20 Revocation or suspension of allocations or licenses.
The Administrator may, after a hearing, revoke or suspend
any allocation or license issued under this regulation, on
grounds relating to the national security, or the violation of
the terms of Proclamation 3279, this regulation, or licenses
issued pursuant thereto.
Sec. 21 Appeals.
(a) There is hereby established an Oil Import Appeals Board,
comprised of one representative each from the Departments of
Commerce, Defense, and Interior, designated respectively, by the
Secretaries of such Departments. The Board shall elect a Chairman
from its own membership,
(b) The Appeals Board shall hear and consider petitions and
appeals by persons affected by this regulation and may, on grounds
of hardship, error, or other relevant special consideration, but
within the limits of the maximum levels of imports established in
section 2 of Proclamation 3279:
(1) modify any allocation made to any person under
this regulation;
(2) grant allocations of crude oil and unfinished oils
in special circumstances to persons with importing
histories who do not qualify for allocations under
this regulation; and
(3) review the revocation or suspension of any allocation
or license.
The decisions of the Appeals Board on petitions and appeals shall
be final,
(c) The Appeals Board may adopt, promulgate, and publish such
rules of procedure as it deems necessary for the conduct of its
hearings.
Sec, 22 Definitions,
As used in this regulation:
(a) "person" includes an individual, a corporation, firm or
other business organization or legal entity, and an agency of a
86,

(6) lubricating oil - a refined petroleum
distillate or specially treated petroleum residue
used to lessen friction between surfaces;
(7) residual fuel oil - a topped crude oil or
viscous residuum which, as obtained in refining or
after blending with other fuel oil, meets or is
the equivalent of Military Specification Mil-F-859
for Navy Special Fuel Oil and other more visious fuel
oil, such as No. 5 or Bunker C;
(8) asphalt - a solid or semi-solid cementitious
material which gradually liquefies when heated, in which
the predominating constituents are bicumins, and which is
obtained in refining crude oil.
(f) "unfinished oils" means one or more of the petroleum oils
listed in paragraph (e) of this section, or a mixture or combination
of such oils, which are to be further processed other than by
blending by mechanical means;
(g) "Administrator" means Administrator, Oil Import Administration,
Department of the Interior, or his duly authorized representative;
(h) The words, "importation," "importing," "import," "imports,"
and "imported," include both entry for consumption and withdrawal
from warehouse for consumption;
(i) "refinery inputs" include all crude oil, imported unfinished
oils, natural gasoline mixed in crude oil, and plant and field
condensates mixed in crude oil, which are further processed, other
than by blending by mechanical means, but do not include unfinished
oils which have not been imported;
(j ) "refinery capacity" means a plant which, by further
processing crude oil or unfinished oils, other than by blending
by mechanical means, manufactures finished petroleum products.
sgd - Elmer F. Bennett
Acting Secretary of the Interior
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state, territorial, or local government, but does not
include a department, establishment, or agency of the United
States;
(b) "Districts I- IV" means the District of Columbia and
all of the States of the United States except those States
within District V;
(c) "District VM means the States of Arizona, Nevada,
California, Oregon, Washington, Alaska, and the Territory of
Hawaii;
(d) "crude oil" means crude petroleum as it is produced at
the wellhead;
(e) "finished products" means any one or more of the following
petroleum oils, or a mixture or combination of such oils, which
are to be used without further processing except blending by
mechanical means:
(1) liquefied gases - hydrocarbon gases recovered
from natural gas or produced from petroleum refining and
kept under pressure to maintain a liquid state at ambient
temperatures;
(2) gasoline - a refined petroleum distillate which,
by its composition, is suitable for use as a carburant
in internal combustion engines;
(3) jet fuel - a refined petroleum distillate used
to fuel jet propulsion engines;
(4) naphtha - a refined petroleum distillate falling
within a distillation range overlapping the higher gasoline
and the lower kerosenes;
(5) fuel oil - a liquid or liquefiable petroleum
product burned for lighting or for the generation of
heat or power and derived directly or indirectly from
crude oil, such as kerosene, range oil, distillate
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